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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
vs.
CaseNo.20050060-CA

OSCAR IVAN CORNEJO,
Defendant/Appellee.

:
BRIEF OF APPELLANT

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The State appealsfroma pretrial dismissal with prejudice of an information charging
driving under the influence of alcohol with priors, a third degree felony; failure to respond
to an officer's signal to stop, a third degree felony; driving on a suspended or revoked
license, a class B misdemeanor; and no evidence of security, a class B misdemeanor. This
Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-18a-1(a) & 78-2a-3(2)(e) (West
2004).
STATEMENT OF ISSUE. PRESERVATION.
AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
Did the trial court exceed the limits of reasonability when it dismissed with prejudice
for lack of speedy trial after the prosecutor asked for a continuance because she was not
prepared for an unnoticed on-the-spot suppression hearing, set only minutes after the a
constitutional challenge was raised for thefirsttime on the morning of trial?
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

A denial of a continuance is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Riddle v. Celebrity
Cruises, 2004 UT App 287, % 5, 105 P.3d 970. A dismissal of an information for
"unreasonable delay" is also reviewed for abuse of discretion; however, a court has no
authority to dismiss with prejudice unless it first finds "unconstitutional delay," that is, a
violation of the right to a speedy trial. Salt Lake City v. Dorman-Ligh, 912 P.2d 452, 456
(Utah App. 1991) (recognizing that dismissal with prejudice requires a finding of
unconstitutional delay or a violation of the statute of limitations). Cf. State v. Trafny, 799
P.2d 704, 706 (Utah 1990) (applying a balancing test to speedy trial determinations). The
issue was preserved atR118: 10, 14-18, 22-25, 30-43, 47, 50-55.
STATUTES, RULES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Copies of the following determinative provisions are attached in Addendum A,
together with any other provision cited in argument:
Utah R. Crim. P. 12 - Motions;
Utah R. Crim. P. 25 - Dismissal without trial;
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.5 (West 2004) Admissibility of chemical test
results in actions for driving under the influence—Weight of evidence.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On the morning of the trial, prior to jury selection, defense counsel revealed for the
first time that he was challenging the admission of the result of an involuntary blood draw.
Over the prosecutor's objection, the trial court ordered an immediate evidentiary hearing to
address the constitutional admissibility of the draw. The Highway Patrol sergeant who
authorized the draw, but was not otherwise a trial witness, was unavailable. The prosecutor

2
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asked for a continuance. The trial court refused. The prosecutor then moved to dismiss the
information without prejudice. Instead, the court dismissed the information with prejudice
based on a finding of unconstitutional trial delay. To assess the validity of this ruling, the
procedural history from filing to dismissal is presented in detail.1
On February 11, 2004, defendant was arrested and charged with driving under the
influence of alcohol [DUI], a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44
(West 2004), failure to respond to an officer's signal to stop, a third degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-13.5 (West 2004), driving on a suspended or revoked
license, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 53-3-227(3) (West 2004),
and no evidence of security (insurance), a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 41-12a-303.2 (West 2004) (R. 1-2).2 Defendant appeared before a magistrate the
same day (R. 11-12). The Ogden Public Defender's Office was assigned to represent him
(id.). Two days later, private counsel, now appellate counsel, entered his appearance (R. 14).
At the initial arraignment on February 11, the magistrate set bail, but ordered
defendant released on his own recognizance if Pretrial Services determined that he qualified
*In compliance with the marshaling requirement imposed on an appellant, the
record facts are fully set forth in the State's Statement of the Case. Discussion of why the
marshaled facts do not support the trial court's finding of a speedy trial violation will be
addressed in argument. See State v. Orr, 2004 UT App 413,19, 103 P.3d 164
(reaffirming an appellant's duty to marshal all evidence in support of a challenged factual
finding and then "show that, even when viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to
the trial court's ruling," the finding is clearly erroneous) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted).
2

The DUI was elevated to a third-degree felony based on defendant's prior six DUI
convictions since 1997 (R. 9).
3
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(R. 11-12). Eight days later, on February 19,2004, defendant was releasedfromjail on bond
(R. 19).
Defense Continues March 1 Hearing
A preliminary hearing was set for Monday, March 1, 2004 (R. 11-12). On that day,
the State's witnesses were present and the prosecutor was ready to proceed (R. 15-16,101 02). However, on the previous Thursday, defense counsel had requested a copy of the police
videotape of defendant's pursuit and arrest to use in preparation for trial (R. 21-22). By
Monday, defense counsel had not yet received the tape, but was not sure if his "request went
to the wrong place or something" and asked for a continuance to allow him time to obtain
the tape (R. 15-16; R116: 4). The magistrate (Judge Roger Dutson) continued the
preliminary hearing to March 29,2004 (R. 15-16). On March 4,2004, the court ordered that
a copy of the tape be released to defendant (R. 15-16, 21-22).
Defense Continues March 29 Hearing
On March 29, the State's witnesses were present and the prosecutor was again ready
to proceed with the preliminary hearing (R. 25-26, 103-04). Defense counsel had not
received the videotape and asked to continue the preliminary hearing for five weeks—to May
3,2004—to accommodate his schedule (Rl 16:5). When the magistrate (Dutson) questioned
the length of the continuance, defense counsel responded:

4
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Yeah, we were going to do it in two weeks, but that's spring break, and I'm
afraid it conflicts with my schedule, so May 3rd would work the best for us if
that's okay, Your Honor, and we would waive any speedy requirements that
might fall in there.
(id.). The hearing was continued to May 3 as requested (R. 25-26).
The Parties Jointly Continue May 3 Hearing
On May 3, the prosecutor again was ready to proceed with the preliminary hearing
(R116: 7). A possible first degree felony involving defendant was under review by the
County Attorney's Office (Rl 16:7-8). The prosecutor and defense counsel jointly asked for
a continuance to see if the new charge would be filed (id.). Defense counsel asked that the
preliminary hearing be continued for at least one month (Rl 16: 8). The magistrate (Dutson)
agreed and continued the hearing to June 7, 2004 (R. 27-28).
Defense Continues June 7 Hearing
On June 7, defense counsel said the no charge would be filed (R116: 10). A
preliminary hearing was previously scheduled for that day, but defense counsel asked that
it be set over for five weeks—to July 12,2004—because he had "Scout Camp and other outof-state commitments" (R116: 10). The magistrate (Dutson) continued the hearing as
requested to July 12 (Rl 16: 11).
Prosecution Continues July 12 Hearing;
Defense Extends Date
The prosecutor subpoenaed four witnesses for the July 12 preliminary hearing, but
when one of them was unavailable, asked for a one-week continuance (R. 105-08; Rl 16:12).
Defense counsel had no objection to the continuance and asked for a further extension of one
5
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month to August 9, 2004 (Rl 16: 12). The magistrate (Dutson) continued the hearing to the
date requested by defendant (R. 31-33).
Preliminary Hearing Held August 9
On August 9, a preliminary hearing was conducted before Judge Ernest Jones (R. 3334). Defendant was bound over for trial as charged (id.).3 The same day, he was arraigned
before Judge Dutson, who told defendant to file any motions to suppress evidence by
September 1, 2004 (R. 33-34). An evidentiary hearing was set for October 6, 2004 (id.).
Defense Moves to Suppress Evidence Derivative ofIllegal Stop
Defendant filed a motion to suppress on September 8, 2004 (R. 36-37). In the
accompanying memorandum, defendant claimed that he committed no traffic offense and,
therefore, the stop of his vehicle was illegal and any derivative evidence should be
suppressed (R. 3 8-46). The prosecutor opposed the motion and set forth the factual basis for
defendant's traffic violations and the officer's pursuit (R. 5 8-62). The prosecutor additionally
stated in her memorandum:
Subsequent involuntary blood and urine tests revealed that Defendant had a
blood-alcohol level of 0.16 at the time of his arrest.
(R. 59). The prosecutor also sent defendant a copy of the Highway Patrol policy governing
involuntary testing. Defendant, however, did not challenge the involuntary tests.

3

No tape of these proceedings could be located and no transcript is available.
6
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The evidentiary hearing was conducted as scheduled (Rl 16:15-64). On October 18,
2004, Judge Dutson denied defendant's motion to suppress after finding "clearly adequate
evidence" to support the stop (Rl 16: 65).
December and Alternate February Trial Dates Set
The case was then set for pretrial conference on November 8, and for trial on
December 15, 2004, as a second setting because another case was already for that trial that
day (Rl 16: 67-68). The prosecutor commented, "[t]he sooner the better" (Rl 16: 68).
Defendant subsequently moved to continue the pretrial conference one week—to
November 15, 2004—because the parties were in settlement negotiations (R. 68-69).
On November 15, defense counsel informed the court that the case could not be
settled (R. 70-71). He asked if in addition to the previously scheduled December trial date,
an alternate trial date could be set as a first setting on February 3,2005 (Rl 16: 70-71). The
trial court reserved both dates for trial and scheduled another pretrial conference for
November 29, 2004 (id.).
The November 29 pretrial conference was subsequently continued to December 6,
2004, at defendant's request so he could confer with the prosecutor and determine if the other
case scheduled for December 15 would be tried (Rl 16: 74).
On December 6, a pretrial conference was conducted (Rl 16: 75-76). Defendant's
case was now thefirstsetting for December 15 (id.) The prosecutor said she was ready for
trial (id). Defense counsel casually warned that he might need a continuance (id.). He had

7
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subpoenaed information from the Highway Patrol, but what he received was the "wrong
information" and he was planning on re-subpoenaing the agency (id.).
Defense Reveals Objection to Blood Draw
On December 15, the parties appeared for trial. The prosecutor was ready to proceed
(Rl 18:38). In chambers, just prior to jury selection, defendant for the first time objected to
admission of the blood test result (Rl 18: 12). Defense counsel explained that he had not
raised the issue prior to trial because he wanted the jury to hear the circumstances of the
involuntary draw to support his theory ofpolice misconduct (Rl 18:5-6,11,17-18,26,46-47,
52). Counsel said he planned on objecting to the test result mid-trial and in front of the jury
(R118: 5, 11-12,26-27,47).
The prosecutor objected (Rl 18:7-8,21). The prosecutor argued that defendant knew
the draw was involuntary, but chose not to challenge its admission in a pretrial motion to
suppress (R118: 14-15, 38-39). Consequently, the prosecutor asserted, the challenge was
waived pursuant to rule 12, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure (Rl 18: 22-25, 35).
Trial Court Orders Immediate Evidentiary Hearing
The trial court agreed that defendant strategically chose not to raise his challenge to
the admissibility of the blood draw until the last minute, which was a "heck of a time to be
bringingitup"(R118:7,11,17-18,26,46-47,52). Nevertheless, the court believed that an
involuntary blood draw was inadmissible unless the court preliminarily ruled on its
constitutional admissibility (Rl 18:7-10,29). The court believed it had this obligation even
if defendant remained "silent" and did not challenge the evidence (R118: 49-51).
8
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Accordingly to the court, the prosecutor could not rely on waiver and was obligated to
establish the constitutionality of the draw before its result could be admitted (Rl 18: 34, 39,
50). See Addendum C (Transcript of December 15 Proceedings).
The court released the jury until the afternoon and ordered an on-the-spot evidentiary
hearing (Rl 18: 29-32). He told the prosecutor she had fifteen minutes to get ready (R118:
31 -32,34). The prosecutor objected and explained that the Highway Patrol sergeant who had
authorized the draw, but was not otherwise a trial witness, was traveling to Idaho and
unavailable (R118: 30). The State's trial witnesses, including the toxicologist and other
foundation witnesses, were present and could establish the evidentiary basis for admission
of the test result, but not the agency's basis for its authorization (R118: 21, 38, 41). The
prosecutor was aware of the recent involuntary blood draw case, State v. Rodriguez, 2004
UT App 198, 93 P.3d 854, cert granted, 100 P.3d 220 (Utah 2004), but needed additional
time to prepare the legal issues once she knew defendant's specific grounds for objection
(R118: 9-10, 22, 35-36, 41).4 See Add C.
Prosecution Moves to Continue and to Dismiss Without Prejudice
Because the prosecutor was not prepared to proceed with an immediate evidentiary
hearing, she moved to continue the trial to the alternate trial date (February 3) and moved to
continue the suppression hearing to some date in the interim (Rl 18: 36). Defense counsel
objected because he was prepared to proceed and "it would be prejudicial to my client not
to have the trial in the month of December but to bump it off to when all the [holiday] debts
4

Defendant never stated the grounds he intended to raise in objection to the draw.
9
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hit in February" (Rl 18: 27).5 The trial court denied the continuance (Rl 18: 36). See Add.

a
The prosecutor then moved to dismiss the information subject to refiling (Rl 18: 30,
42, 48-49). The court responded that any dismissal would be with prejudice "because the
defense is ready to proceed... and the reasons for the continuance are unjustifiable" (Rl 18:
30, 55). The prosecutor explained that if she proceeded on the dispositve motion and
received an adverse ruling, she effectively could not appeal because trial would immediately
commence (Rl 18:17,23). In an effort to remedy this problem, the court offered to sever the
DUI charge (which was dependent on the blood draw)fromthe other charges (Rl 18:52-53).
The prosecutor responded that severance would not help her because the charges were all
part of a single criminal episode (R118: 53-55). If the non-DUI charges were tried first,
subsequent prosecution of the felony DUI would likely be barred under the single episode
provision and/or double jeopardy (id.). The court summarily rejected this concern (Rl 18:
55).
Trial Court Dismisses with Prejudice
The prosecutor challenged the authority of the court to dismiss with prejudice (Rl 18:
37-40). Citing rule 25, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, the prosecutor asserted that if the

5

Defense counsel explained that there was a "legend" among the defense bar that
"prosecutors will not try cases during December because they believe jurors for the will
of the season or whatever it is are more lenient" (Rl 18: 27). The court called this a
"fiction" and irrelevant; the court's concern was that the jury was "out here ready to go to
trial" (Rl 18: 27-29).
10
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court dismissed with prejudice, "the state would ask for findings that it's being made based
on unconstitutional delay" (Rl 18: 39). The court responded:
It isn't. I'm just - well, it could possibly be. But I - what I'm saying is the
parties are here, ready for trial, you should be prepared to go to trial today and
you've had ample notice of this trial date. And I am - the defense has
mentioned in chambers that they want the trial today, they're here ready to go,
and so we'll either have the trial today or you can move to dismiss it without
prejudice - or with prejudice.
(Rl 18:39). After the prosecutor again asked if the court wasfindingunconstitutional delay,
the court repeated:
I'm denying your motion because this case has been set for trial, the defendant
is ready to proceed, and on the day of trial, it's not a timely motion.
(R118: 40). After more discussion, the court said it did not believe the prosecutor was
justified in assuming that the blood result would be admissible just because no motion to
suppress wasfiledprior to trial (Rl 18:50,55). The court opined that, unlike other evidence,
an involuntary blood draw implicates "due process and self-incrimination—or involuntary
incrimination because a defendant has the right to refuse to give a blood test in a DUI case"
(Rl 18: 49). Nevertheless, the court did not fault the prosecutor:
It's not apportionment of blame. I understand. Ms. Beaton, you're one of the
finest prosecutors that I've ever seen, you really are... . You just are a very
diligent prosecutor. And I want you to know that there's no blame here, it's
just something that unfortunately you weren't prepared to deal with today and
I - you're one of the most thorough prosecutors. And I understand the
problem here, you assumed something that perhaps shouldn't have been
assumed. But anybody that's been a prosecutor or a defense attorney runs into
these kinds of things and so it's certainly not a fault issue.
It's a matter of I've got a jury here ready to try the case, we've got a
defendant here ready to be tried, he's got a right to have a speedy, public trial
and this date was the date set for a trial and both sides have to come prepared.
11
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— and you assumed that [defendant] had the burden to raise [his challenge to
the blood result] and I'm saying, no, he can object to it at trial. That's really
where that problem arises
He could be silent about it even, you know. He
doesn't have that burden.
(Rl 18: 50-51). See Add. C.
When the prosecutor characterized defendant's objection as a motion to suppress, the
court explained:
Well, when I learned about it [defense counsel] wasn't saying he was going to
move to suppress it, he was just going to object to it. It's the same thing as all
[sic] practical matter. He's just going to object to its admissibility at trial. He
loves all the facts surrounding it coming in so he wanted all of those things as
part of his strategy.
(Rl 18:52). See also R. 118:7,11,17-18,26,46-47. The prosecutor again asked if the court
was finding a speedy trial violation and the court again said, "No, that's not—that's not the
issue" (Rl 18: 53). The court was adding "with prejudice" to its dismissal order because the
prosecutor was unreasonable in asking for a dismissal just "because I am not giving you time
to address that one issue" (Rl 18: 56). See Add. C.
Trial Court's Formal Order of Dismissal
On December 30, 2004, the court entered a formal order of dismissal with prejudice
(R. 88-99). See Addendum B (Findings and Order of Dismissal With Prejudice). The court
found that even before trial, the prosecutor caused substantial delays by (1) failing to provide
defendant with the videotape of his arrest and (2) due to her busy trial calendar (R. 94-95).
The court called the prosecutor's refusal to proceed on December 15 a "mere whim" in that
she never provided an explanation for her refusal to proceed other than "she did not expect

12
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the defendant to object to the test results being admitted" (R. 92-93 & 95). The court claimed
that by not being prepared, the prosecutor "made a basic mistake recognized by even
inexperienced prosecutors by assuming the Court would allow the admissibility of any blood
test without proper foundation in a DUI case" (R. 96). The prosecutor then "aggravated]
the situation" by refusing to proceed on the non-DUI charges" for "no reason" (R. 95-96).
The court characterized the prosecutor's actions as "grossly misdirected and abusive of the
criminal justice system" in that she deliberately attempted to "unjustifiably delay the trial and
hamper the defendant in bringing the matter to a resolution" (R. 96). In essence, the
prosecutor "wanted everyone else to jump out of her way and give in to her whims" (id.) Her
conduct amounted to "a deliberate unjustified manipulative attempt by the prosecutor to
delay the trial in order to prevent the casefrombeing tried as scheduled and preventing the
defendant from having this case resolved speedily" (R. 97).
The court found that the defense had "from the very beginning of this case requested
the Court to set hearings and the trial at the earliest possible dates" (R. 97). Moreover,
defendant "did not waive his right to a speedy trial" and "has fully preserved his right to a
speedy trial" by "consistently requesting a speedy disposition" (id.). During the December
15 proceeding, defense counsel established "the hardship, expenses and emotional drain" a
trial continuance would cause defendant (R. 96). If the trial had been continued to the
alternate trial date in February, the court presumed that defendant would have suffered
"tremendous emotional upset" (R. 98). Moreover, by unreasonably refusing to proceed, the
prosecutor caused defendant a "substantial financial burden," which amounted "to a taking
13
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of his material means without justification or due process" (R. 98). The trial court found that
the prosecutor's "inexcusable" actions violated defendant's speedy trial right and dismissed
with prejudice (R. 96 & 99). The State timely appealed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts of defendant's offenses are only minimally relevant to this appeal. In sum,
Trooper Kris Jones observed defendant pull out of a parking lot into the center lane of a twolane street, which was "obviously a traffic violation" (Rl 16:17-22). The trooper made a Uturn and pursued defendant, who was driving about 40 mph, a rate about 10 mph "faster then
normal traffic" on the roadway (Rl 16: 23-25, 34 & 36). The trooper observed defendant
commit another improper lane change (Rl 16: 25).
The trooper turned on his vehicle's emergency lights, overhead strobes, side strobes
and "wig-wag" lights, which made his vehicle look "pretty much... like a Christmas tree"
(Rl 16: 31-33). Defendant ignored the trooper (Rl 16: 33). The trooper turned on his siren,
but defendant ignored him and continued down the road (Rl 16: 33).
Defendant failed to stop at a stop sign (Rl 16: 35). The trooper was concerned that
defendant would also not stop at a red light at the next intersection and used a PIT (pursuit
intervention technique) to stop defendant's vehicle by pushing it into the curb (Rl 16: 3 7-40).
Defendant was not injured by the maneuver (Rl 16: 41).
Defendant refused a breath test (R. 8-9; Rl 18: 5, 44-45). After the trooper learned
that defendant had six previous DUI convictions, he requested and presumptively received
departmental authorization for an involuntary blood draw (id.). When the draw was made,
14
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defendant stuck out his arm for the test and no physical struggle ensued (Rl 18:44-45). The
blood test revealed an alcohol level of 0.16 grams by weight (Rl 18: 46).6
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
A trial court has limited authority to dismiss a felony information with prejudice.
Here, the court had no authority to dismiss with prejudice because the prosecutor's actions
did not cause unconstitutional trial delay.
The sequence of events began when defendant failed to timely raise a challenge to the
admissibility of his involuntary blood draw. Notwithstanding defendant's failure, the trial
court opined that a pretrial evidentiary hearing was mandated and gave the prosecutor only
minutes to prepare for the suppression hearing. The prosecutor was not prepared to proceed
due to the unavailability of a witness and moved for a continuance. When that was denied,
the prosecutor moved for a dismissal of the information subject to its refiling. The trial court
abused its discretion in denying both motions.
Even assuming arguendo that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the
prosecutor's motions, the court nevertheless abused its authority when it dismissed the
information with prejudice. A dismissal without prejudice may be a sanction against a
prosecutor when no reasonable alternative exists, but it is rarely an appropriate remedy. A
dismissal with prejudice is permissible only when the trial court finds unconstitutional delay
or a violation of the statute of limitations. Here, the trial court found unconstitutional trial

6

Though blood and urine samples were taken, the discussions below only referred
to the blood draw (R. 8-9).
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delay. The record, including the court's oral pronouncements on the morning of trial, does
not support the court's finding. The trial court, therefore, had no authority to dismiss the
information with prejudice.

This Court should reverse the dismissal, reinstate the

information, and remand the case for trial.
ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURTS FINDING OF UNCONSTITUTIONAL DELAY IS
CLEARLYERRONEOUS; CONSEQUENTLY, THE TRIAL COURTHAD
NO AUTHORITY TO DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE THE FELONY
INFORMATION
A trial court may dismiss an information prior to trial for "substantial cause and in
furtherance of justice"; but the prosecutor retains the discretion to refile the dismissed
information. See Utah R. Crim. P. 25(a) & (d) (establishing when an information may be
dismissed prior to trial) (West 2004); Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-7 (West 2004) (same).7 See
also Utah Code Ann. § 77-2-1 (West 2004) & Utah R. Crim. Proc. 5 (both requiring a
prosecuting attorney's authorization for a felony or class A misdemeanor). See Addendum
A (Statutes and Rules).
If, however, the trial court finds "[t]here is unreasonable or unconstitutional delay in
bringing a defendant to trial," dismissal of the information is mandated. Utah R. Crim. P.
25(b). If the delay is only "unreasonable," the dismissal is without prejudice and the
information may be refiled. Utah R. Crim. P. 25(d). If, on the other hand, the delay is found

7

Rule 25 and section 77-1-7 both address the pretrial dismissal of an information,
but rule 25 does so with more detail. See Add. A. Here, reference will only be to the rule,
consistent with the trial court's order.
16
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to be "unconstitutional," that is, a violation of the defendant's constitutional right to a speedy
trial, the dismissal is with prejudice and further prosecution of the charged offenses is barred.
Id. See also Salt Lake City v. Dorman-Ligh, 912 P.2d 452, 456 (Utah App. 1996). In this
case, the trial court found unconstitutional delay in bringing defendant to trial and dismissed
with prejudice the multi-felony information. See Addendum B (Findings and Order of
Dismissal with Prejudice).
The sequence of events which culminated in the dismissal began when defendant
failed to timely challenge the admission of his involuntary blood draw by September 1, as
directed by the court, or at leastfivedays prior to trial, as dictated by rule 12, Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure. See R. 33-34 (directing defendant to file any motions to suppress
evidence by September 1,2004); Utah R. Crim. P. 12(c) & (f)(requiring a motion to suppress
evidence to be filed at least five days prior to trial or the objection is waived). See Add. A.
Because defendant failed to challenge the admissibility of the involuntary blood draw, the
prosecutor correctly believed that the issue of its constitutionality was waived (Rl 18:3 8-3 9).
She assumed that she only needed to establish the test's evidentiary foundation to admit the
evidence at trial (Rl 18: 50).
Instead, prior to jury selection, the trial court learned that defendant intended to object
to the blood test mid-trial (Rl 18: 5-6). As a matter of strategy, defendant wanted all the
circumstances surrounding the draw introduced into evidence to support of his theory of
police misconduct (Rl 18: 7,11,17-18,26,46-47,52). Defendant then planned to object to
the test result in front of the jury and to argue that the jury could find the test inadmissible
17
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as a "matter of fact" (Rl 18: 5, 11-12, 26-27, 47). Properly, the trial court refused to allow
defendant to proceed in this fashion (R118: 8).8 Improperly, the court set an immediate
evidentiary hearing on what the court agreed was essentially a motion to suppress the draw
(R118: 7-10, 29). See discussion, infra. According to the court, it made no difference
whether defendant complied with rule 12f s timeliness requirement because even if defendant
was "silent," the court was obligated to make an initial determination of the constitutional
admissibility of the blood draw before it could be admitted into evidence (Rl 18: 49-51).
The prosecutor was not prepared to proceed with an unnoticed on-the-spot
suppression hearing. A witness critical to the hearing, but not otherwise a trial witness, was
not available. Additionally, because she had no prior notice, the prosecutor was not
prepared—in the minutes given her—to address legal issues which defendant had yet to
articulate and the court, by its own admission, needed time to study (Rl 18: 9-10,22,30,3 536,41,49). Reasonably, the prosecutor sought a continuance, which was denied (Rl 18:36).
The prosecutor then asked that the felony information be dismissed subject to refiling (Rl 18 :
30,42, 38-49). The court refused and dismissed with prejudice because "the case has been
set for trial, the defendant is ready to proceed, and on the day of trial, it's not a timely
motion" (R118: 40).

See Addendum C (Transcript of December 15 Proceeding).

Subsequently, in its formal order of dismissal with prejudice, the court found unconstitutional
delay caused by the prosecutor's "deliberate unjustified manipulative attempt... to delay

*See Utah R. Evid. 103(c) (directing that objections challenging the admissibility
of evidence should be raised outside the presence of the jury); Utah R. Evid. 104(a)
(recognizing that court determines the admissibility of evidence).
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trial in order to prevent the casefrombeing tried as scheduled and preventing the defendant
from having his case resolved speedily" (R. 97). See Add. B.
As will be discussed, the court abused its discretion in setting an immediate hearing
and in denying the prosecutor's request for a continuance. But even if these rulings were
proper, the trial court abused its discretion and exceeded its authority in barring further
prosecution. A dismissal with prejudice is a draconian remedy which is permissible only
when a trial court finds an unconstitutional denial of a defendant's right to a speedy trial or
a violation of the statute of limitations. See Utah R. Crim. P. 25(d). Because the record
establishes that no unconstitutional delay occurred here, the trial court exceeded its authority
in dismissing the information with prejudice—an action which turned the right to a speedy
trial from "a shield against oppression" into "a sword . . . to decapitate the processes of
justice." State v. Hafen, 593 P.2d 538, 541 (Utah 1979).
A.

The trial court erred in requiring a preliminary inquiry into the
constitutional admissibility of the blood draw.

The trial court found that the prosecutor had no reason to assume that defendant would
not object to the admissibility of the blood draw at trial simply because he failed to move to
suppress the evidence pretrial (R. 95). According to the court, defendant could remain silent
and the prosecutor would still be obligated to establish the "proper foundation" for a blood
test in a DUI (R. 96; Rl 18: 49-51).
The court explained what it considered "proper foundation." According to the court,
an involuntary blood draw was different than other evidence:

19
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Well, it's a constitutional violation of the defendant's rights in a DUI case
possibility, although I ha ven't fully researched it myself and would be
prepared to rule on that within an hour or so, but it just comes to my mind that
there's a constitutional issue of due process and self-incrimination - or
involuntary incrimination when a defendant has a right to refuse to give a
blood test in a DUI case and suffer certain consequences as a result of that
because the procedures are established on how it is to be done. But again, that
is what initially comes to my mind about this at least addressing the
constitutional questions of a defendant's right to due process and the
incrimination against his own desires similar to any other incrimination.
For example, I - I read the law as being different in a DUI case than
someone who is convicted of a crime who has to give a test for DNA samples
because there are statutory provisions governing the one and the other as well.
I think there are statutory provisions on voluntary testing in DUI cases, and the
exception would have to be persuasive, you know, for any court I think to
allow it in.
(R118: 49).

Accordingly, unless defendant affirmatively stipulated to the draw's

admissibility, the court believed it was obligated—irrespective of defendant's objection—to
make an initial determination of the draw's constitutional admissibility before allowing it into
evidence (Rl 18: 15,49-51).
The trial court erred when it stated that the admission of an involuntary blood draw
is subject to special statutory admissibility requirements. To the contrary, even when an
involuntary blood draw is obtained in violation of agency policy, it is admissible unless
"prohibited by Rules of Evidence or the constitution." See Utah Code Ann. § 41-644.5(l)(b) (West 2004) {Add. A). See also State v. Garcia, 965 P.2d 508, 515 (Utah App.
1998) (concluding that non-compliance with agency regulations does not prevent the
admission of a blood draw, but "precludes the Statefrominvoking the statutory presumption
of the test's validity").
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The court also significantly erred in ruling that an involuntary blood draw implicates
due process and the right against self-incrimination. The United States Supreme rejected this
argument over forty years ago. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757,759-61 (1966)
(holding that an involuntary blood draw does not violate due process or the right against selfincrimination). Accord State v. Rodriguez, 2004 UT App 198,ffif12-14, 93 P.3d 854, cert
granted on other grounds, 100 P.3d 220 (Utah 2004). An involuntary blood draw implicates
only the Fourth Amendment. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 768; Rodriguez, 2004 UT App 198,
fflf 13-14. Because an involuntary taking constitutes a search and seizure, the taking must be
supported by probable cause and obtained though reasonable means and pursuant to a
warrant or an exception to the warrant requirement. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770-71. See
also Rodriguez, 2004 UT App 198, \ 14 (exigency); State v. Bredehoft, 966 P.2d 285,29293 (Utah App. 1998) (consent), cert, denied, 982 P.2d 88 (Utah 1999).
Contrary to the trial court's ruling, the introduction of an involuntary blood draw
involves no different constitutional pre-requisite than any other Fourth Amendment seizure.
See Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 768; Rodriguez, 2004 UT App 198,ffl[13-16. If a defendant
intends to challenge the admission of an involuntary blood draw, he must provide timely
notice to the prosecution by filing a motion to suppress at least five days before trial or as
otherwise set by the court. See Utah R. Crim. P. 12(c)(1)(B) (Add. A). If a defendant fails
to timely file a motion to suppress, the challenge to the admissibility of the blood draw is
waived. See Utah R. Crim. P. 12(f). See also State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 660 (Utah
1985) ("the failure to assert a particular ground in a pre-trial suppression motion operates as
21
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a waiver of the right to challenge the subsequent admission of evidence on that ground")
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Once a constitutional objection to a blood draw is waived, a prosecutor need only
establish the test's evidentiary foundation for it to be admissible at trial. Cf. Garcia, 965
P.2d at 515 (recognizing that a chemical test is admissible in a DUI prosecution subject to
"traditional foundational requirements"); Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.5(l)(b) (recognizing that
a blood test is admissible in a DUI prosecution if not "prohibited by Rules of Evidence and
the constitution").
Here, defendant strategically chose not to file a motion to suppress the blood draw or
its result (R118: 7, 11, 17-18, 26, 46-47, 52). A strategic decision precludes a trial court
from finding "cause" to excuse the late challenge pursuant to rule 12(f). See Davis v. United
States, 411 U.S. 233, 241 (1973) (recognizing that strong enforcement of waiver rule
precludes invited error); State v. Tuttle, 399 P.2d 580, 582 (Utah 1965) (same). See also In
Re General Determination ofRights to the Use of Water, 2004 UT 106, \ 43,110 P.3d 666
(defining "good cause" to excuse a late filing as "special circumstances essentially beyond
a party's control"). Consequently, if defendant's failure to timely move to suppress cannot
be excused pursuant to rule 12, it also cannot be ignored. Yet, here, that is what the trial
court did (Rl 18: 7-10, 30-31). This was error.
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B.

The trial court abused its discretion in denying the prosecutor's
request for a continuance.

The trial court's misconception of the constitutional character of an involuntary blood
draw underlaid its insistence that a suppression hearing be conducted and no continuance
permitted. The court's decision was abusive and its underlying findings are clearly
erroneous.
In its written findings, the court claimed that the prosecutor was accorded a
"substantial recess" before being ordered to proceed with the evidentiary hearing (R. 90).
Thefindingis clearly erroneous.
The marshaled evidence establishes that before the jury selection, the parties met in
chambers and began an extended discussion of the admissibility of defendant's prior
convictions and ultimately of the involuntary blood draw (Rl 18; 5-30). At 9:45 a.m., the
court announced that it would excuse the jurors until 1:30 p.m. and, in the interim,
"immediately" conduct an evidentiary hearing on the constitutional admissibility of the blood
draw (Rl 18:29-30). The court went back into court, addressed the jurors, and then excused
the jurors until 1:30 p.m. (Rl 18:31). The court asked the prosecutor if she needed "a few
more minutes to gather things together and be ready to proceed with the evidentiary hearing"
(R. 32). The prosecutor responded that she "need[ed] more than a few minutes" (R. 32-33).
More argument about the evidentiary hearing ensued (Rl 18: 33-34). The prosecutor again
objected to proceeding when she had "not even been given 10 minutes to talk to [her]
officers" (R. 34). The court said it would take a 15-minute break and immediately begin the
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evidentiary hearing (Rl 18: 34). At the conclusion of the recess, the prosecutor moved for
a continuance rather than proceed with the hearing (Rl 18: 35-36).
From the transcript, the actual length of the announced recess cannot be determined.
But the exact length of the recess is immaterial to the question of abuse. For what ever
minutes the prosecutor was given to prepare, the fact remains that the court ordered an
unnoticed on-the-spot evidentiary hearing on a dispositve motion in a felony case, which
issue had been waived when defendant failed to timely raise it. Rule 12 is designed to avoid
this type of hearing "by ambush" by requiring timely written notice of a constitutional
challenge. Here, that did not happen. In sum, the marshaled facts do not support that the
court fairly allowed the prosecutor a reasonable time to prepare for the evidentiary hearing.
The trial court also clearly erred when it denied the prosecutor's request for a
continuance because her motion was "untimely" (R. 90). Certainly, a motion to continue the
morning of a jury trial is disfavored. But, here, the reasoning behind finding is circular. For
even if, as the court asserts, the prosecutor should have anticipated a constitutional challenge,
a hearing on the challenge was not discussed or set until that morning (Rl 18:29,36). Within
minutes of the hearing be set, the prosecutor moved for a continuance (id.). Consequently,
because the marshaled evidence establishes that the request for continuance was
contemporaneous with the setting of the hearing, the motion clearly was not untimely.
The most egregious error the court committed in denying the request for a continuance
was in characterizing the request as a "whim" (R. 93, 96). No record facts support this
finding. Instead, the marshaled facts establish only the finding's clear error.
24
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The marshaled facts establish that when the court set the on-the-spot hearing, the
prosecutor did not have and could not obtain a critical witness who was not under subpoena
and was traveling out-of-state (R118: 30). The unavailability of a witness is uniformly
considered a valid reason for trial delay. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 531 (1972).
Accord State v. Trafny, 799 P.2d 704, 708 n.14 (Utah 1990) (u[t]he absence of necessary
and vital witnesses has been deemed a valid reason for delay by the State if the witnesses
would be available within a reasonable time") (citations omitted). See also State v. Mathis,
319 P.2d 134,136 (Utah 1957) ("[w]here there is some reasonable basis for the request [for
a continuance] it should not be denied merely because it may work some inconvenience to
the other party").
In erroneously finding that the prosecutor was acting on a "whim" in opposing the
unnoticed hearing, the court also clearly erred in finding that she provided "no reason" for
not proceeding. Again, no evidence supports this finding; the marshaled facts only support
its clear error.
The marshaled facts establish that the prosecutor objected to the sua sponte
evidentiary inquiry into the constitutionality of the blood draw. Citing Rodriguez and rule
12, the prosecutor argued that defendant was the one obligated to challenge the evidence by
timely moving to suppress it (Rl 18: 24-25, 35-36). Because defendant failed to do so, the
prosecutor argued that the constitutional challenge was waived and no suppression hearing
was necessary (Rl 18:24-25). This prosecutor's position was not a whim, but based on Utah
rule and precedent.
25

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The marshaled facts further show that the prosecutor explained that she could not
proceed with the evidentiary hearing because the necessary witness was unavailable (Rl 18:
30). The court offered to relax the hearsay rules to minimize the problem, but the prosecutor
responded that her trial witnesses did not know the basis for the sergeant's authorization of
the blood draw (id.). The prosecutor further explained that if she was compelled to proceed
without her witness and the blood test was suppressed, the State's right to appeal the adverse
ruling would effectively be lost because trial would commence immediately (Rl 18:41). See
State v. Troyer, 866 P.2d 528,531 (Utah 1993) (recognizing that pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 77-18a-l (West 2004), the State may directly appeal the suppression of evidence when it
results in the dismissal of the charge). The prosecutor's concerns were not a whim, but a
reasonable view of the facts and law.
The prosecutor continued with her reasons. She explained that even though the court
offered to sever the charges, severance would not help the State (R118: 53-55). The
prosecutor considered the charges to be part of the same single criminal episode (id.). See
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-401 (West 2004) (defining "single criminal episode" as including
"all conduct which is closely related in time and is incident to an attempt or an
accomplishment of the same criminal objective"). If the charges were severed and the
prosecutor proceeded to trial on the non-DUI charges, j eopardy would attach (Rl 18: 5 5). If
the prosecutor then attempted to try the severed DUI charge, prosecution would likely be
barred by double jeopardy and/or the single criminal episode statute (id.). The prosecutor's
concerns were reasonable. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-1-402 & 403 (West 2004) (barring
26
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separate prosecutions for crimes included in the same criminal episode). See also State v.
Harris, 2004 UT 103, \ 24 n.6, 104 P.3d 1250 (encouraging trial courts to be "mindful" of
the single criminal episode provisions to avoid double jeopardy bar).
The trial court summarily rejected the prosecutor's concerns (R118: 55). In its
subsequent findings, the court found that the prosecutor never offered any explanation: "The
Court encouraged [the prosecutor] to try the other three charges while the jury was available.
She refused. She gave no reason." (R. 90). Because the marshaled evidence does not
support this finding, it is clearly erroneous.
Similarly, the court later maligned the prosecutor in its formal findings and claimed
that her "mistaken" assumptions were ones that even an "inexperienced" prosecutor would
not make (R. 96). However, on December 15, the court said exactly the opposite when it
praised the prosecutor's competency and diligence:
It's not apportionment of blame
You're one of the finest prosecutors that
I've ever seen . . . Your just are a very diligent prosecutor.... But anybody
that's been a prosecutor or a defense attorney runs into these kinds of things
and so it's certainly not a fault issue.
(R118: 50). See full quotation, supra at 11. The marshaled evidence supports the court's
oral finding made on December 15. See Statement of the Case, supra. No facts support the
court's subsequent written lambast of the prosecutor—except for the fact that she was not
prepared to argue a waived constitutional issue on the morning of trial.
But anger at the prosecutor—justified or not—rarely warrants the disassembling of
a felony prosecution. See Dorman-Ligh, 912 P.2d at 456 ("[dismissal of a criminal
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information as a sanction against the prosecutor is rarely appropriate, even if the prosecutor
is in contempt of court).

See also State v. Ruffin, 853 A.2d 311, 322 (N.J. 2004)

(recognizing that courts exist to do justice and "[n]o eagerness to expedite business, or to
utilize fully the court's time, should be permitted to interfere with our high duty of
administrating justice in the individual case"); State v. Bolen, 13 P.3d 1270, 1274 (Kan.
2000) ("[dismissal of charges oftentimes punishes the public rather than the prosecutor and
creates a windfall for the defendant).
In sum, the marshaled facts do not support the court's findings that the prosecutor was
unreasonable or untimely in seeking a continuance. Consequently, the court abused its
discretion in denying the request.
C

The trial court clearly erred in finding a speedy trial violation.

During the December 15 proceedings, the trial court repeatedly insisted that it was not
finding a speedy trial violation or assessing fault or blame (Rl 18: 39,49, 50-51). See Add.
C. Nevertheless, when the court entered its subsequent formal findings, it found that the
prosecutor's actions amounted to "a deliberate unjustified manipulative attempt... to delay
trial in order to prevent the casefrombeing tried as scheduled and preventing the defendant
from having his case resolved speedily" (R. 97). See Add. B. The court attributed the
discovery and other hearing delays to a lack of diligence by the prosecutor (R. 95-97). In
contrast, the court found that defendant consistently asserted his right to a speedy trial and
endeavored to proceed expeditiously (R. 97). The court found that defendant established that
he would suffer substantial emotional harm if the December trial were continued (R. 98). The
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court also found that the financial costs incurred by defendant as a result of the prosecutor's
allegedly dilatory tactics amounted to a "taking"without the benefit of due process (R. 9899). The court relied on these subsidiary findings to ultimately find unconstitutional delay
(R. 99). The court's findings are without evidentiary support and, consequently, amount to
clear error. Each will discussed in the context of the speedy trial analysis.
As previously discussed, in this case, the information could only be dismissed with
prejudice if the court found unconstitutional delay, that is, if it found that defendant's right
to a speedy trial was violated. See Utah R. Crim. P. 25(d). See discussion, supra. Speedy
trial analysis is guided by a four-part balancing test, which focuses on (a) the length of the
delay, (b) the reasons for the delay, (c) whether defendant asserted his right to a speedy trial,
and (d) whether defendant suffered prejudice from the delay. Barker, 407 U.S. at 530;
Trafny, 799 P.2d at 706. In making this ad hoc determination, the trial court must consider
all relevant facts, but no single factor controls. Barker, 407 U.S. at 530. Moreover, "[u]ntil
there is some delay which is presumptively prejudicial, there is no necessity for inquiry into
the other factors that go into the balance." Id. Accord Trafny, 799 P.2d at 706.
Length of Delay, No precise number of days establish unconstitutional delay.
Barker, 407 U.S. at 521-22. Even a delay of 4 V2 years between arrest and trial may not
constitute a violation. See Trafny, 799 P.2d at 708 n.16; State v. Ossana, 739 P.2d 628,632
(Utah 1987). Here, ten months passed between arrest and dismissal; if the trial had been
continued to February, twelve months would have passed. See Statement of the Case.
During that period, defendant was incarcerated only 8 days (R. 1-2, 19).
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The trial court found that a one-year delay was "substantial," but not presumptively
unconstitutional (R. 94-95). The court, however, attributed blame to the prosecutor (id.)
According to the court, the prosecutor significantly delayed discovery, often had a conflicting
court calendar, and on December 15, provided no reason for the requested trial continuance
(R. 88, 90). On the other hand, the court found defendant blameless, noting that defendant
consistently sought early hearings and trial settings and consistently invoked his right to a
speedy trial (R. 97-99).
The marshaled evidence supports that approximately one month elapsed before
defendant received a copy of the tape he requested through discovery (R. 21-22,25-26). The
record facts do not support that the prosecutor necessarily caused the delay.
The marshaled evidence establishes that defendant wanted a copy of the trooper's
videotape of defendant's arrest to assist defendant in preparing for trial (R. 21-22). Though
the tape was not necessary for the preliminary hearing, he twice asked for a continuance of
the preliminary hearing because he did not have the tape (Rl 16:4-6).9 The first time defense
counsel asked for the tape was only two working days before the scheduled hearing on March
1 (R. 15-16, 21-22). When the tape was not available, defense counsel did not blame the
prosecutor, but told the magistrate that "maybe the request went to the wrong place or

9

See Utah R. Crim. 7(i)(2) ("[objections to evidence on the ground that it was
acquired by unlawful means are not properly raised at the preliminary examination").
Defendant did subsequently use the tape during the October suppression hearing when he
challenged the legality of the stop (R116: 48-52).
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something" (Rl 16: 4).10 On March 4, the court ordered a copy of the Highway Patrol tape
released to the defense (R. 21-22). On March 29, defendant said that he still did not have the
tape, but implied that he expected to receive it soon (Rl 16: 5-6). Again, defense counsel
attributed no blame to the prosecutor (id.). Defense counsel told the court that even though
they could proceed with the preliminary hearing in two weeks, he needed a five-week
continuance because of his own schedule (Rl 16: 5). In seeking this continuance, defense
counsel "waived any speedy trial requirements that might fall in there" (id.).
The marshaled facts establish only that it took approximately one month for defendant
to receive a tape of his own arrest. The record does not establish if the tape, created by the
Highway Patrol trooper, was actually in the prosecutor's possession or still under agency
control (R. 21-22; R116: 4-5, 48-50). While a prosecutor is ultimately responsible for
complying with a discovery order pursuant to rule 16, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, the
marshaled facts negate any suggestion that defense counsel blamed the prosecutor for the
delay or that the prosecutor intentionally caused the delay.
The court similarly found that the prosecutor's busy calendar contributed to the length
of the pretrial delays and opined that "for some reason, Ms. Beaton's trial calendar seems to
be more crowded that [sic] any other prosecutor's calender, as she more frequently rejects
trial dates suggested by the Court than do other prosecutors" (R. 94). There is no marshaled
evidence to support this claim. The record reveals no time when the prosecutor's calendar
created a delay for defendant.
I0

Presumptively, the request was made to the Highway Patrol (Rl 16: 4-5, 48-50).
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In connection with the trial court's multiple findings alleging delays caused by the
prosecutor, the marshaled evidence establishes that the prosecutor was ready to proceed with
preliminary hearing on March 1, on March 29, and on May 3—all dates which defendant
continued or stipulated to the continuance.11 See Statement of the Case. The prosecutor was
not ready to proceed on July 12 because a witness was not available and asked for a oneweek continuance (R. 105-08; Rl 16: 12). Defendant not only did not object, but asked for
the continuance to be extended one month (R. 31-33; Rl 16: 12). See Ossana, 739 P.2d at
632; State v. Snyder, 932 P.2d 120, 130 (Utah App. 1997) (both recognizing that a
defendant's failure to object to delays negates a finding of a speedy trial violation).
When the December trial date was set, the prosecutor readily accepted that date and
responded, "[t]he sooner the better" (Rl 16:68). The prosecutor's eagerness to proceed with
trial is consistent with the court's own in-court observation that the prosecutor was "very
diligent," which observation contradicts the court's subsequent written finding that the
prosecutor was derelict and difficult to schedule (R. 94-95; Rl 18: 50-51).
In sum, the marshaled evidence support that discovery of the tape was delayed by one
month. Given the limited scope of a preliminary hearing, see n.9, supra, the record does not
establish why the delay in receiving the tape necessarily impacted the scheduling of the
preliminary hearing, but for defense counsel's preference to have the tape before proceeding.
The marshaled evidence further supports that the prosecutor sought a one-week continuance

11

The prosecutor was ready to proceed on May 3, but agreed to the continuance to
determine if defendant would be facing additional charges (Rl 16:7).
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of the preliminary hearing. No other delays—until December 15—are attributable to the
prosecutor. See discussion, infra.
Reasons for Delay and Defendant's Assertion of His Speedy Trial Right. "The
conduct of both the prosecutor and the defendant are weighed" in a speedy trial
determination. Barker, 407 U.S. at 530. See Ossana, 739 P.2d at 632. "Delays caused by
the defendant will not be counted against the State and will weigh against the defendant in
considering the totality of the circumstances." Trafny, 799 P.2d at 708 n. 15. See also State
v. Hoyt, 806 P.2d 204, 208 (Utah 1999) (same). Moreover, the unavailability of a witness
is uniformly recognized as a valid reason for delay. See id. at n.14. See also Barker, 407
U.S. at 531; Hoyt, 806 P.2d at 208.
When the trial court addressed Barker's second and third factors, it focused
exclusively on the prosecutor's refusal to proceed on December 15 (R. 94-95). The trial
court found that the prosecutor provided no reason for her refusal to proceed (R. 90-91 & 9596). As previously discussed, this finding is clearly erroneous. See discussion, supra.
The trial court only minimally addressed the reasons for defendant's requested delays
(R. 95-97). The court acknowledged that defendant's motion to suppress the illegal stop
delayed the proceedings, but did not consider that the period of the delay occasioned by
defendant's motion (September 8 to October 18) was nearly identical in length to the
continuance the prosecutor sought on the day of trial (December 15 to February 3) (R. 36-37;
R116:65).
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The trial court found that "[djefendant and his attorney have from the very beginning
of this requested the Court to set hearings and the trial at the earliest possible dates" (R. 97).
The court also found that "defendant has consistently requested a speedy disposition of his
case and objected to any further delays" (R. 99). Again, these findings are clearly erroneous.
There is no evidence that defendant asserted his speedy trial right or requested an early
disposition of his case prior to December 15. Indeed, defendant's actions before December
15 belie an assertion of the right.
The marshaled evidence establishes that defendant freely sought continuances for a
variety of reasons and often for periods beyond what appeared necessary or sought by the
prosecutor. On March 1, he asked for a continuance because he wanted the trooper's
videotape, but admitted that he probably sent the request to the wrong place (Rl 16: 4). On
March 29, defense counsel asked for a five-week continuance and affirmatively "waived any
speedy trial requirements that might fall in there" to obtain a continuance because "that's
spring break and I'm afraid it conflicts with my schedule" (Rl 16: 5). On May 3, the parties
jointly asked for a continuance to see if a new charge would be filed and defendant asked that
the continuance be for one month (Rl 16: 7-8). On June 7, defense counsel asked for a fiveweek continuance because of "Scout Camp and other commitments" (Rl 16:10). On July
12, the prosecutor asked for a one-week continuance because a witness was unavailable
(Rl 16:12). Defendant had no objection and expanded the continuance to one month (Rl 16:
12). When trial was scheduled for on a second setting for December 15, defendant voiced
no objection and only asked for a firm alternate setting on February 3 (Rl 16: 67, 70-71).
34 J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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And in a pretrial conference on December 6, defense counsel casually warned that he might
need a continuance of the scheduled trial because he subpoenaed the "wrong information"
from the Highway Patrol and planned on re-subpoenaing the agency (Rl 16: 75-76).
The fact that defendant continued these pretrial hearings is not unusual or necessarily
inappropriate. But neither were the prosecutor's more minimal requests. However,
defendant's own actions negate the court's findings that he aggressively sought the early
disposition of his case. SeeSnyder, 932P.2dat l30-3l;Hoyt, 806P.2dat208; Ossana, 739
P.2d at 632. Consequently, the court's findings that defendant only minimally contributed
to the delays and consistently expressed a desire for a speedy trial are clearly erroneous.
Prejudice. The record does not support the court's finding of unconstitutional delay.
The trial court nevertheless proceeded to consider Barker's final factor: whether defendant
experienced prejudice as a result of the delays (R. 97-99).
To support a speedy trial violation, prejudice must result from the delay. Barker, 407
U.S. at 533-54. Enforcement of a speedy trial right raises "three identifiable areas of
concern: (i) to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration; (ii) to minimize anxiety and concern
of the accused; and (iii) to limit the possibility that the defense will be impaired." Snyder,
932 P.2d at 130. The concerns found in (i) and (iii) are not at issue in this case.
In connection with (ii)—anxiety—the trial court found that defendant suffered
emotional harm from the prosecutor's delays (R. 98). The court presumed that with the
anticipation of trial, the "build up of emotion for a defendant must be very substantial. Then
the let down of not having the case finally resolved and necessity of possibility of having to
35
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go through all this again, as requested by the prosecutor, must have been a tremendous
emotional upset to the defendant" (R. 98). According to the court, defense counsel
"pointe[d] out the hardship, expenses and emotional drain [a continuance] would cause the
defendant" (R. 96). This finding has no record support and is clearly erroneous.
The marshaled evidence establishes that defendant made only one claim of prejudice.
When the prosecutor requested a continuance to the alternate February date, defense counsel
objected:
[M]aybe this is just a legend that passes around among the defense bar, but
most defense attorneys—my brother is a prosecutor and a judge and they, at
least in Arizona, prosecutors will not try cases during December because they
believe jurors for the will of the season or whatever it are more lenient. And
for that matter . . . it would be prejudicial to my client not to have the trial in
the month of December but to bump it off to when all the debts hit in February.
(R118: 27). Other than this statement, the record contains no evidence of defendant's
"distress."
The record also contains no evidence of costs incurred by defendant, but for the fact
that he retained private counsel after qualifying for a public defender (R. 11-12, 14).
Notwithstanding, the trial court speculated that defendant incurred a "substantial unnecessary
financial burden" because trial did not proceed as scheduled (R. 98). The court found that
this burden was caused "by the prosecutor's unjustified conduct... [and] amounts to a taking
of [defendant's] material means without justification or due process" (R. 98). The court's
finding is clearly erroneous since no evidence supports it. Moreover, to the extent that he
incurred some costs of representation on December 15, that fact alone does not raise a due
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process concern. For "due process is not concerned with ordinary levels of inconvenience
because the nature of the criminal justice system necessarily inconveniences those individuals
who have been accused of crimes." State v. Morgan, 2001 UT 87, ^f 22, 34 P.3d 767
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
In sum, the trial court's finding of a speedy trial violation is not supported by the
record facts. At best, the marshaled facts establish that some ordinary delay occurred. But
"[w]hile diligence in preparation should be insisted upon, the courts necessarily must be
somewhat indulgent of perplexing situations which arise, to the end that both sides have a
fair opportunity to present their respective cases." Mathis, 319 P.2d at 136. In this case, that
result did not occur.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that the Court reverse the
dismissal with prejudice, reinstate the information, and remand for trial.
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED
This Court has discretion "to determine which matters require oral argument, which
decisions require a full opinion, and which do not." Grand County v. Rogers, 2002 UT 25,
\16, 44 P.3d 734. Here, the decisional process would be significantly aided by oral
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argument. Cf. Utah R. App. P. 29(a)(3). Therefore, the State requests oral argument.
Respectfully submitted this j^Y^-day of June, 2005.
MARKL. SHURTLEFF
Attorney General
CHRISTINE F. SOLTIS
Assistant Attorney General
Counsel for Appellee
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Christine F. Soltis
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RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

R U L E 5.

INFORMATION AND INDICTMENT

(a) Unless otherwise provided, all criminal prosecutions whether for felony,
misdemeanor or infraction shall be commenced by the filing of an information
or the return of an indictment. Prosecution by information shall be commenced before a magistrate having jurisdiction of the offense alleged to have
been committed unless otherwise provided by law.
(b) Unless otherwise provided, no information shall be filed before a magistrate charging the commission of a felony or class A misdemeanor unless the
prosecuting attorney shall first authorize the filing of such information. This
restriction shall not apply in cases where the magistrate has reasonable cause
to believe that the person to be charged may avoid apprehension or escape
before approval can be obtained.
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RULE 7.

PROCEEDINGS BEFORE MAGISTRATE

(a) When a summons is issued in lieu of a warrant of arrest, the defendant
shall appear before the court as directed in the summons.
(b) When any peace officer or other person makes an arrest with or without
a warrant, the person arrested shall be taken to the nearest available magistrate
for setting of bail. If an information has not been filed, one shall be filed
without delay before the magistrate having jurisdiction over the offense.
(c)(1) In order to detain any person arrested without a warrant, as soon as is
reasonably feasible but in no event longer than 48 hours after the arrest, a
determination shall be made as to whether there is probable cause to continue
to detain the arrestee. The determination may be made by any magistrate,
although if the arrestee is charged with a capital offense, the magistrate may
not be a justice court judge. The arrestee need not be present at the probable
cause determination.
(c)(2) A written probable cause statement shall be presented to the magistrate, although the statement may be verbally communicated by telephone,
telefaxed, or otherwise electronically transmitted to the magistrate.
(c)(2)(A) A statement which is verbally communicated by telephone shall be
reduced to a sworn written statement prior to submitting the probable cause
issue to the magistrate for decision. The person reading the statement to the
magistrate shall verify to the magistrate that the person is reading the written
statement verbatim, and shall write on the statement that person's name and
title, the date and time of the communication with the magistrate, and the
determination the magistrate directs to be indicated on the statement.
(c)(2)(B) If a statement is verbally communicated by telephone, telefaxed, or
otherwise electronically transmitted, the original statement shall, as soon as
practicable, be filed with the court where the case will be filed.
(c)(3) The magistrate shall review the probable cause statement and from it
determine whether there is probable cause to continue to detain the arrestee.
(c)(3)(A) If the magistrate finds there is not probable cause to continue to
detain the arrestee, the magistrate shall order the immediate release of the
arrestee.
(c)(3)(B) If the magistrate finds probable cause to continue to detain the
arrestee, the magistrate shall immediately make a bail determination. The bail
determination shall coincide with the recommended bail amount in the Uniform Fine/Bail Schedule unless the magistrate finds substantial cause to deviate
from the Schedule.
(c)(4) The presiding district court judge shall, in consultation with the Justice
Court Administrator, develop a rotation of magistrates which assures availability of magistrates consistent with the need in that particular district. The
schedule shall take into account the case load of each of the magistrates, their
location and their willingness to serve.
(c)(5) Nothing in this subsection (c) is intended to preclude the accomplishment of other procedural processes at the time of the determination referred to
in paragraph (c)(1) above.
(d)(1) If a person is arrested in a county other than where the offense was
committed the person arrested shall without unnecessary delay be returned to
the county where the crime was committed and shall be taken before the
proper magistrate under these rules.
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(d)(2) If for any reason the person arrested cannot be promptly returned to
the county and the charge against the defendant is a misdemeanor for which a
voluntary forfeiture of bail may be entered as a conviction under Subsection
77-7-21(1), the person arrested may statfe in writing a desire to forfeit bail,
waive trial in the district in which the information is pending, and consent to
disposition of the case in the county in which the person was arrested, is held,
or is present.
(d)(3) Upon receipt of the defendant's statement, the clerk of the court in
which the information is pending shall transmit the papers in the proceeding or
copies of them to the clerk of the court for the county in which the defendant is
arrested, held, or present. The prosecution shall continue in that county.
(d)(4) Forfeited bail shall be returned to the jurisdiction that issued the
warrant.
(d)(5) If the defendant is charged with an offense other than a misdemeanor
for which a voluntary forfeiture of bail may be entered as a conviction under
Subsection 77-7-21(1), the defendant shall be taken without unnecessary delay
before a magistrate within the county of arrest for the determination of bail
under Section 77-20-1 and released on bail or held without bail under Section
77-20-1.
(d)(6) Bail shall be returned to the magistrate having jurisdiction over the
offense, with the record made of the proceedings before the magistrate.
(e) The magistrate having jurisdiction over the offense charged shall, upon
the defendant's first appearance, inform the defendant:
(e)(1) of the charge in the information or indictment and furnish a copy;
(e)(2) of any affidavit or recorded testimony given in support of the information and how to obtain them;
(e)(3) of the right to retain counsel or have counsel appointed by the court
without expense if unable to obtain counsel;
(e)(4) of rights concerning pretrial release, including bail; and
(e)(5) that the defendant is not required to make any statement, and that the
statements the defendant does make may be used against the defendant in a
court of law.
(f) The magistrate shall, after providing the information under paragraph (e)
and before proceeding further, allow the defendant reasonable time and opportunity to consult counsel and shall allow the defendant to contact any attorney
by any reasonable means, without delay and without fee.
(g) If the charge against the defendant is a misdemeanor, the magistrate
shall call upon the defendant to enter a plea.
(g)(1) If the plea is guilty, the defendant shall be sentenced by the magistrate
as provided by law.
(g)(2) If the plea is not guilty, a trial date shall be set. The date may not be
extended except for good cause shown. Trial shall be held under these rules
and law applicable to criminal cases.
(h)(1) If a defendant is charged with a felony, the defendant shall be advised
of the right to a preliminary examination. If the defendant waives the right to
a preliminary examination, and the prosecuting attorney consents, the magistrate shall order the defendant bound over to answer in the district court.
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(h)(2) If the defendant does not waive a preliminary examination, the magistrate shall schedule the preliminary examination. The examination shall be
held within a reasonable time, but not later than ten days if the defendant is in
custody for the offense charged and not later than 30 days if the defendant is
not in custody. These time periods may be extended by the magistrate for good
cause shown. A preliminary examination may not be held if the defendant is
indicted.
(i)(l) Unless otherwise provided, a preliminary examination shall be held
under the rules and laws applicable to criminal cases tried before a court. The
state has the burden of proof and shall proceed first with its case. At the
conclusion of the state's case, the defendant may testify under oath, call
witnesses, and present evidence. The defendant may also cross-examine adverse witnesses.
(i)(2) If from the evidence a magistrate finds probable cause to believe that
the crime charged has been committed and that the defendant has committed
it, the magistrate shall order that the defendant be bound over to answer in the
district court. The findings of probable cause may be based on hearsay in
whole or in part. Objections to evidence on the ground that it was acquired by
unlawful means are not properly raised at the preliminary examination.
(i)(3) If the magistrate does not find probable cause to believe that the crime
charged has been committed or that the defendant committed it, the magistrate
shall dismiss the information and discharge the defendant. The magistrate may
enter findings of fact, conclusions of law, and an order of dismissal. The
dismissal and discharge do not preclude the state from instituting a subsequent
prosecution for the same offense.
(j) At a preliminary examination, the magistrate, upon request of either
party, may exclude witnesses from the courtroom and may require witnesses
not to converse with each other until the preliminary examination is concluded.
On the request of either party, the magistrate may order all spectators to be
excluded from the courtroom.
(k)(l) If the magistrate orders the defendant bound over to the district court,
the magistrate shall execute in writing a bind-over order and shall transmit to
the clerk of the district court all pleadings in and records made of the
proceedings before the magistrate, including exhibits, recordings, and any
typewritten transcript.
(k)(2) When a magistrate commits a defendant to the custody of the sheriff,
the magistrate shall execute the appropriate commitment order.
(/)(1) When a magistrate has good cause to believe that any material witness
in a pending case will not appear and testify unless bond is required, the
magistrate may fix a bond with or without sureties and in a sum considered
adequate for the appearance of the witness.
(/ )(2) If the witness fails or refuses to post the bond with the clerk of the
court, the magistrate may commit the witness to jail until the witness complies
or is otherwise legally discharged.
(/ )(3) If the witness does provide bond when required, the witness may be
examined and cross-examined before the magistrate in the presence of the
defendant and the testimony shall be recorded. The witness shall then be
discharged.
(/)(4) If the witness is unavailable or fails to appear at any subsequent
hearing or trial when ordered to do so, the recorded testimony may be used at
the hearing or trial in lieu of the personal testimony of the witness.
[Amended effective May 1, 1993; November 1, 1996; April 29, 1998- April 1 1999April 1, 2004; April 1, 2005.]
'
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RULE 12. MOTIONS
(a) Motions. An application to the court for an order shall be by motion,
which, unless made during a trial or hearing, shall be in writing and in
accordance with this rule. A motion shall state succinctly and with particularity the grounds upon which it is made and the relief sought. A motion need not
be accompanied by a memorandum unless required by the court.
(b) Request to Submit for Decision. When the time for filing a response to a
motion and the reply has passed, either party may file a request to submit the
motion for decision. The request shall be a separate pleading captioned
''Request to Submit for Decision." The Request to Submit for Decision shall
state the date on which the motion was served, the date the opposing memorandum, if any, was served, the date the reply memorandum, if any, was served,
and whether a hearing has been requested. The notification shall contain a
certificate of mailing to all parties. If no party files a request, the motion will
not be submitted for decision.
(c) Time for filing specified motions. Any defense, objection or request,
including request for rulings on the admissibility of evidence, which is capable
of determination without the trial of the general issue may be raised prior to
trial by written motion.
(c)(1) The following shall be raised at least five days prior to the trial:
(c)(1)(A) defenses and objections based on defects in the indictment or
information other than that it fails to show jurisdiction in the court or to charge
an offense, which objection shall be noticed by the court at any time during the
pendency of the proceeding;
(c)(1)(B) motions to suppress evidence;
(c)(1)(C) requests for discovery where allowed;
(c)(1)(D) requests for severance of charges or defendants; or
(c)(1)(E) motions to dismiss on the ground of double jeopardy.
(c)(2) Motions for a reduction of criminal offense at sentencing pursuant to
Utah Code Section 76-3-402, shall be in writing and filed at least ten days prior
to the date of sentencing unless the court sets the date for sentencing within ten
days of the entry of conviction. Motions for a reduction of criminal offense
pursuant to Utah Code Section 76-3-402 may be raised at any time after
sentencing upon proper service of the motion on the appropriate prosecuting
entity.
(d) Motions to Suppress. A motion to suppress evidence shall:
(d)(1) describe the evidence sought to be suppressed;
(d)(2) set forth the standing of the movant to make the application; and
(d)(3) specify sufficient legal and factual grounds for the motion to give the
opposing party reasonable notice of the issues and to enable the court to
determine what proceedings are appropriate to address them.
If an evidentiary hearing is requested, no written response to the motion by
the non-moving party is required, unless the court orders otherwise. At the
conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the court may provide a reasonable time
for all parties to respond to the issues of fact and law raised in the motion and
at the hearing.
(e) A motion made before trial shall be determined before trial unless the
court for good cause orders that the ruling be deferred for later determination.
Where factual issues are involved in determining a motion, the court shall state
its findings on the record.
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(f) Failure of the defendant to timely raise defenses or objections or to make
requests which must be made prior to trial or at the time set by the court shall
constitute waiver thereof, but the court for cause shown may grant relief from
such waiver.
(g) Except in justices' courts, a verbatim record shall be made of all proceedings at the hearing on motions, including such findings of fact and conclusions
of law as are made orally.
(h) If the court grants a motion based on a defect in the institution of the
prosecution or in the indictment or information, it may also order that bail be
continued for a reasonable and specified time pending the filing of a new
indictment or information. Nothing in this rule shall be deemed to affect
provisions of law relating to a statute of limitations.
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RULE 16. DISCOVERY
(a) Except as otherwise provided, the prosecutor shall disclose to the defense
upon request the following material or information of which he has knowledge:
(1) relevant written or recorded statements of the defendant or codefendants;
(2) the criminal record of the defendant;
(3) physical evidence seized from the defendant or codefendant;
(4) evidence known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the
accused, mitigate the guilt of the defendant, or mitigate the degree of the
offense for reduced punishment; and
(5) any other item of evidence which the court determines on good cause
shown should be made available to the defendant in order for the defendant to
adequately prepare his defense.
(b) The prosecutor shall make all disclosures as soon as practicable following
the filing of charges and before the defendant is required to plead. The
prosecutor has a continuing duty to make disclosure.
(c) Except as otherwise provided or as privileged, the defense shall disclose
to the prosecutor such information as required by statute relating to alibi or
insanity and any other item of evidence which the court determines on good
cause shown should be made available to the prosecutor in order, for the
prosecutor to adequately prepare his case.
(d) Unless otherwise provided, the defense attorney shall make all disclosures at least ten days before trial or as soon as practicable. He has a
continuing duty to make disclosure.
(e) When convenience reasonably requires, the prosecutor or defense may
make disclosure by notifying the opposing party that material and information
may be inspected, tested or copied at specified reasonable times and places.
The prosecutor or defense may impose reasonable limitations on the further
dissemination of sensitive information otherwise subject to discovery to prevent
improper use of the information or to protect victims and witnesses from
harassment, abuse, or undue invasion of privacy, including limitations on the
further dissemination of videotaped interviews, photographs, or psychological
or medical reports.
(f) Upon a sufficient showing the court may at any time order that discovery
or inspection be denied, restricted, or deferred, that limitations on the further
dissemination of discovery be modified or make such other order as is appropriate. Upon motion by a party, the court may permit the party to make such
showing, in whole or in part, in the form of a written statement to be inspected
by the judge alone. If the court enters an order granting relief following such
an ex parte showing, the entire text of the party's statement shall be sealed and
preserved in the records of the court to be made available to the appellate court
in the event of an appeal.
(g) If at any time during the course of the proceedings it is brought to the
attention of the court that a party has failed to comply with this rule, the court
may order such party to permit the discovery or inspection, grant a continuance, or prohibit the party from introducing evidence not disclosed, or it may
enter such other order as it deems just under the circumstances.
(h) Subject to constitutional limitations, the accused may be required to:
(1) appear in a lineup;
(2) speak for identification;

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

(3) submit to fingerprinting or the making of other bodily impressions;
(4) pose for photographs not involving reenactment of the crime;
(5) try on articles of clothing or other items of disguise;
(6) permit the taking of samples of blood, hair, fingernail scrapings, and
other bodily materials which can be obtained without unreasonable intrusion;
(7) provide specimens of handwriting;
(8) submit to reasonable physical or medical inspection of his body; and
(9) cut hair or allow hair to grow to approximate appearance at the time of
the alleged offense.
Whenever the personal appearance of the accused is required for the foregoing purposes, reasonable notice of the time and place of such appearance shall
be given to the accused and his counsel. Failure of the accused to appear or to
comply with the requirements of this rule, unless relieved by order of the court,
without reasonable excuse shall be grounds for revocation of pre-trial release,
may be offered as evidence in the prosecutor's case in chief for consideration
along with other evidence concerning the guilt of the accused and shall be
subject to such further sanctions as the court should deem appropriate.
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R U L E 2 5 . DISMISSAL WITHOUT TRIAL
(a) In its discretion, for substantial cause and in furtherance of justice, the
court may, either on its own initiative or upon application of either party, order
an information or indictment dismissed.
(b) The court shall dismiss the information or indictment when:
(1) There is unreasonable or unconstitutional delay in bringing defendant to
trial;
(2) The allegations of the information or indictment, together with any bill of
particulars furnished in support thereof, do not constitute the offense intended
to be charged in the pleading so filed;
(3) It appears that there was a substantial and prejudicial defect in the
impaneling or in the proceedings relating to the grand jury;
(4) The court is without jurisdiction; or
(5) The prosecution is barred by the statute of limitations.
(c) The reasons for any such dismissal shall be set forth in an order and
entered in the minutes.
(d) If the dismissal is based upon the grounds that there was unreasonable
delay, or the court is without jurisdiction, or the offense was not properly
alleged in the information or indictment, or there was a defect in the impaneling or of the proceedings relating to the grand jury, further prosecution for
the offense shall not be barred and the court may make such orders with
respect to the custody of the defendant pending the filing of new charges as the
interest of justice may require. Otherwise the defendant shall be discharged
and bail exonerated.
An order of dismissal based upon unconstitutional delay in bringing the
defendant to trial or based upon the statute of limitations, shall be a bar to any
other prosecution for the offense charged.
(e) In misdemeanor cases, upon motion of the prosecutor, the court may
dismiss the case if it is compromised by the defendant and the injured party.
The injured party shall first acknowledge the compromise before the court or in
writing. The reasons for the order shall be set forth therein and entered in the
minutes. The order shall be a bar to another prosecution for the same offense;
provided however, that dismissal by compromise shall not be granted when the
misdemeanor is committed by or upon a peace officer while in the performance
of his duties, or riotously, or with an intent to commit a felony.
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R U L E 103. RULINGS ON EVIDENCE
(a) Effect of Erroneous Ruling. Error may not be predicated upon a ruling
which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is
affected, and
(1) Objection. In case the ruling is one admitting evidence, a timely
objection or motion to strike appears of record, stating the specific ground of
objection, if the specific ground was not apparent from the context; or
(2) Offer of Proof In case the ruling is one excluding evidence, the
substance of the evidence was made known to the court by offer or was
apparent from the context within which questions were asked. Once the
court makes a definitive ruling on the record admitting or excluding evidence, either at or before trial, a party need not renew an objection or offer
of proof to preserve a claim of error for appeal.
(b) Record of Offer and Ruling. The court may add any other or further
statement which shows the character of the evidence, the form in which it was
offered, the objection made, and the ruling thereon. It may direct the making
of an offer in question and answer form.
(c) Hearing of Jury. In jury cases, proceedings shall be conducted, to the
extent practicable, so as to prevent inadmissible evidence from being suggested
to the jury by any means, such as making statements or offers of proof or
asking questions in the hearing of the jury.
(d) Plain Error. Nothing in this rule precludes taking notice of plain errors
affecting substantial rights although they were not brought to the attention of
the court.
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RULE 104. PRELIMINARY QUESTIONS
(a) Questions of Admissibility Generally. Preliminary questions concerning
the qualification of a person to be a witness, the existence of a privilege, or the
admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the court, subject to the
provisions of Subdivision (b). In making its determination it is not bound by
the rules of evidence except those with respect to privileges.
(b) Relevancy Conditioned on Fact. When the relevancy of evidence depends upon the fulfillment of a condition of fact, the court shall admit it upon,
or subject to, the introduction of evidence sufficient to support a finding of the
fulfillment of the condition.
(c) Hearing of Jury. Hearings on the admissibility of confessions shall in all
cases be conducted out of the hearing of the jury. Hearings on other preliminary matters shall be so conducted when the interests of justice require, or
when an accused is a witness and so requests.
(d) Testimony by Accused. The accused does not, by testifying upon a
preliminary matter, become subject to cross-examination as to other issues in
the case.
(e) Weight and Credibility. This rule does not limit the right of a party to
introduce before the jury evidence relevant to weight or credibility.
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§ 41-6—44.5. Admissibility of chemical test results in actions for driving
under the influence—Weight of evidence
(l)(a) In any civil or criminal action or proceeding in which it is material to
prove that a person was operating or in actual physical control of a vehicle
while under the influence of alcohol or drugs or with a blood or breath alcohol
content statutorily prohibited, the results of a chemical test or tests as authorized in Section 41-6-44.10 are admissible as evidence.
(b) In a criminal proceeding, noncompliance with Section 41-6-44.10 does
not render the results of a chemical test inadmissible. Evidence of a
defendant's blood or breath alcohol content or drug content is admissible
except when prohibited by Rules of Evidence or the constitution.
(2) This section does not prevent a court from receiving otherwise admissible
evidence as to a defendant's blood or breath alcohol level or drug level at the
time relevant to the alleged offense.
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§ 7 6 - 1 - 4 0 1 . "Single criminal episode" defined—Joinder of offenses and
defendants
In this part unless the context requires a different definition, ''single criminal
episode" means all conduct which is closely related in time and is incident to
an attempt or an accomplishment of a single criminal objective.
Nothing in this part shall be construed to limit or modify the effect of Section
77-8a-l in controlling the joinder of offenses and defendants in criminal
proceedings.
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§ 7 6 - 1 - 4 0 2 . Separate offenses arising out of single criminal episode—
Included offenses
(1) A defendant may be prosecuted in a single criminal action for all separate
offenses arising out of a single criminal episode; however, when the same act
of a defendant under a single criminal episode shall establish offenses which
may be punished in different ways under different provisions of this code, the
act shall be punishable under only one such provision; an acquittal or conviction and sentence under any such provision bars a prosecution under any other
such provision.
(2) Whenever conduct may establish separate offenses under a single criminal episode, unless the court otherwise orders to promote justice, a defendant
shall not be subject to separate trials for multiple offenses when:
(a) The offenses are within the jurisdiction of a single court; and
(b) The offenses are known to the prosecuting attorney at the time the
defendant is arraigned on the first information or indictment.
(3) A defendant may be convicted of an offense included in the offense
charged but may not be convicted of both the offense charged and the included
offense. An offense is so included when:
(a) It is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required
to establish the commission of the offense charged; or
(b) It constitutes an attempt, solicitation, conspiracy, or form of preparation to commit the offense charged or an offense otherwise included therein;
or
(c) It is specifically designated by a statute as a lesser included offense.
(4) The court shall not be obligated to charge the jury with respect to an
included offense unless there is a rational basis for a verdict acquitting the
defendant of the offense charged and convicting him of the included offense.
(5) If the district court on motion after verdict or judgment, or an appellate
court on appeal or certiorari, shall determine that there is insufficient evidence
to support a conviction for the offense charged but that there is sufficient
evidence to support a conviction for an included offense and the trier of fact
necessarily found every fact required for conviction of that included offense, the
verdict or judgment of conviction may be set aside or reversed and a judgment
of conviction entered for the included offense, without necessity of a new trial,
if such relief is sought by the defendant.
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§ 7 6 - 1 - 4 0 3 . Former prosecution barring subsequent prosecution for offense out of same episode
(1) If a defendant has been prosecuted for one or more offenses arising out of
a single criminal episode, a subsequent prosecution for the same or a different
offense arising out of the same criminal episode is barred if:
(a) The subsequent prosecution is for an offense that was or should have
been tried under Subsection 76-1-402(2) in the former prosecution; and
(b) The former prosecution:
(i) resulted in acquittal; or
(ii) resulted in conviction; or
(iii) was improperly terminated; or
(iv) was terminated by a final order or judgment for the defendant that
has not been reversed, set aside, or vacated and that necessarily required a
determination inconsistent with a fact that must be established to secure
conviction in the subsequent prosecution.
(2) There is an acquittal if the prosecution resulted in a finding of not guilty
by the trier of facts or in a determination that there was insufficient evidence to
warrant conviction. A finding of guilty of a lesser included offense is an
acquittal of the greater offense even though the conviction for the lesser
included offense is subsequently reversed, set aside, or vacated.
(3) There is a conviction if the prosecution resulted in a judgment of guilt
that has not been reversed, set aside, or vacated; a verdict of guilty that has not
been reversed, set aside, or vacated and that is capable of supporting a
judgment; or a plea of guilty accepted by the court.
(4) There is an improper termination of prosecution if the termination takes
place before the verdict, is for reasons not amounting to an acquittal, and takes
place after a jury has been impanelled and sworn to try the defendant, or, if the
jury trial is waived, after the first witness is sworn. However, termination of
prosecution is not improper if:
(a) The defendant consents to the termination; or
(b) The defendant waives his right to object to the termination;
(c) The court finds and states for the record that the termination is
necessary because:
(i) It is physically impossible to proceed with the trial in conformity with
the law; or
(ii) There is a legal defect in the proceeding not attributable to the state
that would make any judgment entered upon a verdict reversible as a
matter of law; or
(iii) Prejudicial conduct in or out of the courtroom not attributable to the
state makes it impossible to proceed with the trial without injustice to the
defendant or the state; or
(iv) The jury is unable to agree upon a verdict; or
(v) False statements of a juror on voir dire prevent a fair trial.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

§ 77-1-7.

Dismissal without trial—Custody or discharge of defendant

(l)(a) Further prosecution for an offense is not barred if the court dismisses
an information or indictment based on the ground:
(i) there was unreasonable delay;
(ii) the court is without jurisdiction;
(iii) the offense was not properly alleged in the information or indictment; or
(iv) there was a defect in the impaneling or the proceedings relating to
the grand jury.
(b) The court may make orders regarding custody of the defendant pending
the filing of new charges as the interest of justice may require. Otherwise,
the defendant shall be discharged and bail exonerated.
(2) An order of dismissal based upon unconstitutional delay in bringing the
defendant to trial or upon the statute of limitations is a bar to any other
prosecution for the offense charged.
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§ 77—2-1. Authorization to file information
Unless otherwise provided by law, no information may be filed charging the
commission of any felony or class A misdemeanor unless authorized by a
prosecuting attorney.
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
WEBER COUNTY, OGDEN DEPARTMENT

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS
AND ORDER OF DISMISSAL
WITH PREJUDICE
_,

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. 041900798 FS
Honorable Roger S. Dutson,

OSCAR IVAN CORNEJO,

DEC 3 0 2004

Defendant.

w

'1

*n

FACTS
Defendant Cornejo was charged by the State in February 2004, with four offenses:
(1) Third Degree Felony-Evading,
(2) Third Degree Felony-DUI with priors,
(3) Class B Misdemeanor-Revoked Drivers License and,
(4) No Insurance.
The defendant posted bail of $ 11,750.00 to get out ofjail after this arrest. He hired a private
attorney to represent him. After some substantial delays by the prosecution in providing a copy of
a video tape of the arrest to defendant's attorney, a preliminary hearing wasfinallyheld July 9,2004.
At a hearing on October 18,2004, a two-day jury trial was scheduled for December 15 and 16,2004.
At that time, the Court also heard argument on a Motion to Suppress Evidence, filed by Defendant
claiming an improper arrest. The Court ruled against Defendant on that motion. The state issued
subpoenas on October 20,2004 for numerous witnesses. Several additional pre-trials were held with
State vs. Cornejo
Findings, Conclusions and Order
Case No. 041900798 FS
Pagel of 13
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Defendant and his attorney present, and at request of Defendant, an additionalfirm-setback-up trial
date was requested and could not be found until February 3 and 4th, 2005. However, on December
6, 2004 it was confirmed and agreed by both parties the trial would start on December 15th.
On December 15th, the jury panel of about 20 persons appeared and were in the courtroom
awaiting the selection of the eight jurors needed to try the case. Prior to actual selection of the jury,
counsel asked to meet with the Court in chambers. At that time, in chambers, the Court was first
informed by the prosecutor that the Defendant had refused to provide a breath or blood sample at the
time of the DUI arrest and the police officers had gone ahead, over the defendant's objections, and
drawn an involuntary sample of blood and tested it for blood alcohol content. The Defense attorney
stated he would object to the admissibility of the blood test results, though he stated that part of the
defense theory was to show oppressive and illegal police misconduct and therefore, the defense
strategy was to allow the facts surrounding the involuntary blood draw to be presented, but if the
prosecutor intended to offer the test results, the Defendant would object to its admissibility.
The Court advised the parties that the admissibility of the blood test was a legal question and
if they wished to present evidence regarding the same, it shouldfirstbe done outside the presence of
the jury. The prosecutor, Brenda Beaton with the Weber County Attorneys office, then stated that
she had not intended to call the officer who decided to take the blood draw and attempted to criticize
defense counsel for not filing an objection to the blood test in advance of trial. The Court advised
Ms. Beaton that it was her burden to present evidence of admissibility and we were going to go ahead
with the hearing on admissibility, prior to actually empaneling the jury. Ms. Beaton then told the
Court she was unprepared to present the necessary evidence regarding admissibility. The Court
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informed her that it would direct the jury panel to return after the lunch hour and allow her additional
time to prepare for the blood test issue and that hearing would be held later that morning. While still
in chambers, Ms. Beaton then asked for a continuance of the trial. Defense strenuously objected as
they were prepared to try the case as scheduled. The Court denied the motion to continue as being
untimely and without good reason. The prosecutor then told the Court that if it made her go to trial
as scheduled, she would move to dismiss the charges and then refile them at a later time. The Court
advised Ms. Beaton that if she attempted to dismiss the charges at this time, the dismissal would have
to be with prejudice and they could not be refiled. The defense objected to a dismissal and refiling
of the charges as they were prepared to go to trial as scheduled and it would be prejudicial to
continue the matter. The Court told the prosecutor to prepare for the admissibility hearing.
The Court convened, informed the jury panel that some legal issues needed to be resolved and
the panel would be excused until 1:30 p.m. After a substantial recess the Court directed the
prosecutor to proceed and she refused to do so, stating again that she was unprepared to go forward
because she had insufficient evidence to go forward on the DUI case. She moved to dismiss all
charges. The Court then discussed the need to go forward with the trial on the other charges, even
if she did not try the DUI and informed her that it would bifurcate the trial and allow her to come
back later to try the DUI separately if her threatened appeals for denying a continuance or dismissal
by the Court with prejudice were favorable to her. The Court encouraged her to proceed with the
blood test issue. She refused. The Court encouraged her to try the other three charges while the
jury was available. She refused. She gave no reason. It appeared to the Court the evidence on the
other three charges would be separate from the blood test issue. She refused. The Court was aware
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from the file that several witnesses had been subpoenaed. The Court then engaged in multiple efforts
to persuade her to go forward with trial of at least some of the charges as her witnesses had been
subpoenaed, the jury was available and it would be a lengthy delay before the Court could again find
a two-day trial setting. She refused. Ms. Beaton again moved to dismiss all charges, stating she
would refile then at a later time. Defense objected and requested the trial proceed or the charges be
dismissed with prejudice.
Factually, the only reason given to this Court for not trying this case was because the
prosecutor, Ms. Beaton, was unprepared to present a foundation for the admissibility of the blood
test and/or her refusal to try the case as scheduled, without giving any factual or legal reason why the
trial should not proceed. She argued that dismissal and the subsequent refiling of these charges was
purely discretionary with the prosecutor, not the Court, and asserted the Court has no jurisdiction to
dismiss the charges with prejudice or prevent her refiling the charges at a later date.
The Court granted the prosecutor motion to dismiss the charges but as the Court had advised
the prosecutor, they were dismissed with prejudice.

LEGAL ISSUES
I- Does an unprepared prosecuting attorney have the right to cancel a jury trial for no reason
other than prosecutor unpreparedness, on the day of a trial scheduled a substantial period of time in
advance, with the jury panel present and defendant and his attorney present and ready to proceed, by
moving to dismiss the charges without prejudice?
II- What is the authority of a court under the foregoing circumstances to dismiss criminal
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charges with prejudice, thereby preventing the refiling of those charges?
The United States and Utah Constitutions provide that a defendant in a criminal case has the
right to a speedy and public jury trial.
The Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 25 provides as follows:
"(a) In its discretion, for substantial cause and in furtherance of justice, the court
may, either on its own initiative or upon application of either party, order an information
or indictment dismissed.
(b) The court shall dismiss the information or indictment when:
(b) (I) There is unreasonable or unconstitutional delay in bringing defendant to trial;
(d) If the dismissal is based upon the grounds that there was an unreasonable
delay, or the court is without jurisdiction, or the offense was not properly alleged in the
information or indictment, or there was a defect in the impaneling or of the proceedings
relating to the grandjury, further prosecution for the offense shall not be barred and the
court may make such orders with respect to the custody of the defendant pending the filing
of new charges as the interest ofjustice may require. Otherwise, the defendant shall be
discharged and bail exonerated.
An order of dismissal based upon unconstitutional delay in bringing the defendant
to trial or based upon the statute of limitations, shall be a bar to any other prosecution for
the offense charged. . . . "
ISSUE I. URCrP 25 clearly permits the dismissal of the charges by this Court where the
prosecutor has no valid reason to dismiss or proceed with trial. It is certainly unreasonable for a
prosecutor to be unprepared for a trial of this nature with substantial advance agreement on the trial
date. It is unreasonable to cause a defendant to appear numerous times with private counsel, and then
appear for trial prepared to go to answer serious criminal charges, have a jury panel of some 20
citizens present for selection of a jury to hear the case, have the Court block out two days of an
extremely busy trial calendar, and at the mere whim of the prosecutor, demand a continuance and
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when denied as being untimely and without justification, attempt to force the Court into a continuance
by moving to dismiss and refile the charges under what she argues is an absolute prosecutorial
discretion. Rule 25(a) clearly permits dismissal of the charges without prejudice by the Court under
these circumstances.
ISSUE n. The more important question however, is whether or not the Court has the
authority in this case to dismiss the criminal charges with prejudice. Courts should consider many
factors before dismissal of criminal charges because in general, society has the right to demand that
a person who commits criminal acts should not be allowed to avoid punishment without a trial and
then, charges should only be dismissed with clear good cause being shown. Therefore, dismissal of
criminal charges with prejudice must be based on a very important reason, including unconstitutional
delay or based upon the statute of limitations. On the other side of the coin, a person charged with
a crime should not be subjected prejudice due to extremely unfair or unjust prejudicial practices of
a prosecutor such as acting on a whim or readily foreseeable unpreparedness for trial. So, even
though the Court could clearly dismiss these charges for 'unreasonable delay' in this case, do these
delays rises to the level of mandating dismissal with prejudice.
Utah case law sets forth a number of factors under Rule 25(d) for the Court to consider in
determining if there is unconstitutional delay. Each case depends on its own facts. Most tests of
whether there has been an improper constitutional delay focus on four factors: the length of the delay;
the reason for the delay; the defendant's assertion of the right to a speedy trial; and the prejudice to
the defendant resulting from the delay. See Barker v Wingo, 407 US 514, 92 SQ2182 (1972), State
vHafen, 593P.2d 1026(Ut 1979)StatevKnill, 656P.2d 1026(Ut 1982), StatevOssana 739P.2d
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628 (Ut 1987), State vLyva, 906P.2d910 (Ut 1995). These factors must be balanced by the Court
in determining if there is an unconstitutional delay.
LENGTH OF DELAY. The actual length of time of the delay is generally not as critical as
the reasons for the delay, who causes the delay and prejudice to a defendant. Valid or justifiable
reasons for delays generally justify such delays. Overcrowded court calendars justify many delays.
Proper legal motions timelyfiledgenerally justify delays. However, the United States Supreme Court
has made it clear that a deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper the defense should be
weighted heavily against the government. See Barker v Wingojd
This Defendant was booked into jail on February 11, 2004 and shortly thereafter, bailed out
of jail. Trial was scheduled for December 15, 2005. Defendant had been required to appear
numerous times before the Court for arraignment, motions, pre-trials and then for trial. The
prosecution substantially delayed providing a video tape of the arrest to the defense attorney. After
entering his pleas of not guilty, defendant's attorney had always asked for the trial to be set at the
earliest possible time. Had this Court continued this case on the day of trial, the next available date
for trial was February 3-4, 2005, as that was thefirm-setbackup date given on November 15,2004,
at a pretrial conference, an additional delay of over 30 days. That would have caused this case to be
tried about one year after the arrest and much of the delay would have been caused by a heavy court
and prosecutor calendar, substantial delays by the prosecutor in providing the video tape of the arrest
to defense, and unjustified delayfromDecember 15th. This Court has a very busy trial calendar and
for some reason, Ms. Beaton's trial calendar seems to be more crowded that any other prosecutor's
calendar, as she morefrequentlyrejects trial dates suggested by the Court than do other prosecutors.
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However, she is very aware of the difficulty of getting early trial dates and should be aware that any
continuances and loss of assigned trial dates would severely impact not only this case, but the many
other cases that need trial time, including persons who are incarcerated. Though, the length of delay
in this case is very substantial, some of the delay was forfilingand hearing a defense motion and then
because of the Court's busy calendar and the Court will assume Ms. Beaton's busy calendar causes
only justifiable delays. Some delays early on appeared to be for the prosecution failure to provide the
video of the arrest as requested and directed by the Court. In balancing the length of time issue and
reasons for delay, the delay from any continuance from December 15, 2004 added to substantial
delays that are not at all the faults of defendant, and potential after that trial date, must be weighed
very heavily against the government in considering unnecessary delays imposed on a defendant.
Length of delay caused by the government, standing alone, does not justify dismissal with prejudice,
but is one of the factors to be considered.
REASON FOR THE DELAY. On the day of trial, the prosecutor came to court
unprepared to present basic essential evidence to support the admissibility of a blood test derived
from an involuntary blood draw at the time of arrest. She gave no explanation except that she did
not expect the defendant to object to the test results being admitted. There was absolutely no reason
for her to think that. Because of her mistake in preparation, she even told the witness, who had made
the decision to involuntarily draw blood from the defendant that he did not need to appear for trial.
She never asked the defense attorney to stipulate to admissibility of the blood test and defense did
nothing to indicate it would not object to the involuntary blood draw and test results. It is very clear
under Utah law that involuntarily drawn blood can only be used under very limited circumstances.
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Certainly this is an issue which requires preparation by a prosecutor before trial. Additionally, Ms.
Beaton, an experienced prosecutor, made a basic mistake recognized by even inexperienced
prosecutors by assuming the Court would allow the admissibility of any blood test without proper
foundation in a DUI case. With a busy calendar, perhaps her mistakes could be justified, but for her
to then aggravate the situation, she refused to proceed with the trial on the other charges, upon denial
of her untimely motion to continue the trial and the Court's agreement she could bifurcate the DUI
and try it after possible successful appeal. She then made matters even worse by attempting to force
the Court into continuing the case in another manner; i.e., moving to dismiss and refile at a later time.
Certainly somewhat ingenious, but grossly misdirected and abusive ofthe criminal justice system. The
defendant and his attorney were prepared for the scheduled trial and objected to a continuance,
pointing out the hardship, expenses and emotional drain this would cause the defendant. The Court
was prepared for the scheduled trial. The jury was prepared for the scheduled trial. Apparently, all
of the other prosecution witnesses had been subpoenaed and were prepared for the scheduled trial.
The Court personnel and bailiffs were there for the scheduled trial. This Court cannot understand the
prosecutor conduct except that she could not accept the fact that she made a human mistake of
judgment regarding her preparation for this issue and she refused to resolve it properly as she should
have and moved on. Rather, she wanted everyone else to jump out of her way and give in to her
whims, including the defendant who was ready for trial. This is an inexcusable deliberate attempt by
this prosecutor to unjustifiably delay the trial and hamper the defendant in bringing the matter to a
resolution. Further, there is no excuse for not trying the remaining three charges under permission
from the Court to bifurcate the DUI and allow an appeal of the Court's ruling on the DUI issues.
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Therefore, the reasons for the delay are without any factual or legal justification and appear
to this judge to approach prosecutorial misconduct. Under Barker v Wingo, Id, the reason for the
delay in this case must be weighed heavily against the government and in favor of defendant. There
was a deliberate unjustified manipulative attempt by the prosecutor to delay the trial in order to
prevent the case from being tried as scheduled and preventing the defendant from having his case
resolved speedily. The defendant objected to the delay and did not waive his right to a speedy trial.
This trial did not get completed as soon as it reasonably should have.
DEFENDANT'S ASSERTION OF SPEEDY TRIAL RIGHT. Defendant and his
attorney have from the very beginning of this case requested the Court set hearings and the trial at
the earliest possible dates. Although they have been reasonably accommodating when the Court or
prosecutor could not set earlier dates, they have been available and requested early dates. The
defendant has objected to continuance of the trial and cited a valid basis for the objection. Defendant
objected to the prosecutor's request to dismiss the charges and refile them. Defendant requested trial
of the additional three charges once the prosecutor stated she could or would not present evidence
on the DUL Defendant has fully preserved his right to a speedy trial and objected to further delays.
PREJUDICE TO DEFENDANT BY DELAY. Emotions. A common prejudice to
defendants whose right to a trial are improperly delayed is the anxiety they suffer having been charged
with serious criminal offenses and not being able to have them resolved in a timely fashion. This is
a difficult emotion to measure quantitatively, but placing an ordinary prudent man in a position of
realizing that he faces two felony charges, each carrying possible penalties of up tofiveyears in the
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Utah State Prison would clearly create substantial emotional distress. Add to that the two
misdemeanor charges and the emotional stress must increase at least somewhat. The defendant and
his attorney had undoubtedly prepared for trial and came to court on December 15th under the
reasonable assumption that within the two days of trial the uncertainty of being convicted or found
innocent would have been resolved. This build up of emotion for a defendant must be very
substantial. Then the let down of not having the case finally resolved and necessity of possibly having
to go through all this again, as requested by the prosecutor, must have been a tremendous emotional
upset to the defendant. A speedy trial right is designed to minimize anxiety and concern of an
accused. State vMiller, 747P.2d440 (Ut 1987), Barker vWingoJd.
Financial Burden. There have been multiple hearings prior to trial and the defendant has been
represented at all times by his private attorney and undoubtedly has incurred greatfinancialexpenses
for his attorney which would now be greatly aggravated by a totally unjustified increase of expenses
if a new trial were permitted. Nearly a half day with his attorney were spent attempting to get the
case tried on December 15th. There had undoubtedly been several hours just before trial getting
prepared for the actual trial. All those expenses were wasted for the reason the case was not tried.
It appears to this Court that this defendant has been caused substantial unnecessary financial burden
by the prosecutor's unjustified conduct herein and this amounts to a taking of his material means
without justification or due process. In reaching this conclusion, this Court has not taken into
consideration the normal expenses this defendant has incurred in defense of this case, but only those
unnecessary expenses which have been hoisted upon someone already burdened with substantial
financial obligations for attorneys fees.
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This defendant has consistently requested a speedy disposition of his case and objected to any
further delays, preserving his right to have the Court consider the fact that he is substantially
emotionally andfinanciallyprejudiced by this prosecutor's improper failure to proceed with this trial
when it was scheduled.
This Court concludes that the prosecutor's conduct in this case, combined with all other
existing factors relevant to the speedy trial right of this defendant under the Utah and United States
Constitutions and Rule 25 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure require the Court to dismiss all
charges with prejudice and the prosecutor be barredfromfurther prosecution. In doing so, the Court
recognizes that such a dismissal which prevents a defendantfrombeing held accountable for alleged
serious criminal misconduct should only be carefully exercised after balancing the community's rights,
important constitutional rights of a defendant and important basic concepts of fairness in the criminal
prosecution of cases.
DATED this ^ 7 day of December 2004.

ROGER ^DUTSON
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Findings,
Conclusions and Order byfirst-classmail, postage prepaid to the following parties this -Z^Ulday of
December 2004:
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P R O C E E D I N G S
(The following was held in chambers.)
THE COURT:

I understand that you've resolved the

issue of the two priors or -MR. MCKAY:
MS. BEATON:
THE COURT:

Six, eight priors.
Yeah, six.
I mean two within 10. At least two

within 10?
MS. BEATON:

There's six but —

THE COURT:

How many within 10?

MR. MCKAY:

Well if it —

MS. BEATON:
THE COURT:
MS. BEATON:

Six.
Six within 10 years?
Yeah.

I think I've got three or four

certifieds with me.
THE COURT:

Okay.

But is that resolved?

Are you

going to be contesting that issue?
MR. MCKAY:

You know, it's -- I think we've agreed.

THE COURT:

Well, let me -- let me just tell you the

downside for you, Chad —

Brenda, would you twist that thing

so that the sun is not shinning quite so brightly?
MS. BEATON:
THE COURT:

Sure.
Thank you.

The downside for you is technically Brenda has the right
to prove all of them that she wants within a 10-year period
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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of time and you can argue that that prejudices his case, but
that's the way the statute reads, you know, so —

if you

don't resolve it in some manner then I don't know how to tell
this jury what they're doing.

Otherwise, I tell them this is

a felony DUI but we are asking you only to determine whether
or not there's a basic violation of the DUI law in so -MR. MCKAY:

Yes.

It's my understanding that we had

agreed that -- and correct me if I'm wrong -- and that's why
I didn't have any problems with these -- this verdict form is
that I think you even sent over an instruction that if they
find him guilty of the DUI, that we will send them back into
the room to find the other elements and basically will be
certified but it's (unintelligible) -THE COURT:

Well, it's a -- it's a legal question if

you want make it such or I can send it back.

You see,

they -- if I take it from the jury, it has to be clearly
agreed that I can do that part of it separate from the jury.
Otherwise, I have to give it to the jury.

I don't have any

choice.
MR. MCKAY:

Well, I don't think there's much

question but -THE COURT:

Well, it's up to you.

MR. MCKAY:

—

THE COURT:

Chad, it's up to you to decide so

MR. MCKAY:

I have --

to prove that part of it so —
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MS. BEATON:

-- and you have to decide now.

Because

in the beginning of a case, I'm going to tell them what the
basic elements of an offense are so they can know what to be
looking for before they start the case.
MR. MCKAY:

Well, and I —

you know, I'd even

stipulate that if they find the DUI that he has the priors,
and therefore, that's really all they'd have to find.
MS. BEATON:

Well, here's a couple other issues

that -- I guess the real issue is whether or not it comes in
in the case in chief that he has all these priors.
THE COURT:
MS. BEATON:
THE COURT:
MS. BEATON:

It can.
And so here's -But it doesn't have to.
But we're running into two problems;

one, the videotape of the pursuit and the aftermath of
that —
THE COURT: Yeah.
MS. BEATON:

-- involves Trooper Jones mentioning on

the video at one point that the defendant's been arrested six
other times.

It doesn't necessarily say for DUI, but it

suggests.
MR. MCKAY:

And I have no problem with that that

they just -- you know, that's just a risk we'll have to take
because I think they got to see the video.
THE COURT: Yeah.
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M S . BEATON:
.

:s

-here's

a

I think the other

• the other i ssue

f o r c e ( ^ blood draw in this case, and I lie •

.jrceu . Lood draw was done because the defendant had six
..liors within 10 years and :•••• '; '-

••• d-"

they felt like it was an emergency situation
THE COURT:

• •'•••"* . So they did
?

• M S . BEATON:

N o . This was an initial refusal and
<'
" i <» y o i. n q I 11 I i »n <j

t h e n t h e y a i e 1 »"d I i in j 11 J MI
then, a n d then h e

I mean, h e does stick out his arm and

they don1"! L I V M I

It,. LI In in divvii < . 'I

MR. MCKAY.1

inyth.ny, s'uu I JH(»W

I " ni going to argue a bunch of stuff on

lha t so -M S . BEATON:

But so 1 thi nk if he's going

„

i rg i le :i t -- ,

THE COURT:

¥!e ] ] , that a

that's going to b e

-i rg ued a s a ] ega ] i ssue?
MR. MCKAY:

.

_

Perfect 11 I I'm i pi i in
information,

:ng u p that

I'm just going :o qo through the procedures and

pol :i c:i P S , w h e t h e r Ihiey f.O: . ..• •> •
MS. BEATON:
,]

^si :

least •• nothing is

• u

And

o crn^^.

, :;at * s --

\..h> 'he or obi e m is :i f there's a

.

: . _n. / improperly forced the

'"-ood draw
:
M S . BEATON:

Ml J-huh.
Because this jury is going to think,
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well, that seems unusual, why would they do that, you know,
because they don't do that normally.
MR. MCKAY:
MS. BEATON:

That's what we want them to think.
If they think it's unusual, I think

that I have to be able to explain to that jury well the
reason that it was done in this particular case is because
the defendant was refusing field sobrieties, because the

j

defendant refused the chemical test, because he had six
priors, and because he had just been involved in an evading,
the officers felt like it was an exigency circumstance and

,

they then decided with the sergeant's approval -- or well,
with actually the sergeant's instruction to force the blood
draw.
MR. MCKAY:
the six priors?

Can you say it all without bringing up

Because I don't think the statute

requires -MS. BEATON:
MR. MCKAY:

Yeah, but I think that factors in.
I don't think that they —

one of the

factors as I read the -THE COURT:

Well, let me interrupt —

MR. MCKAY:

-- the statute —

THE COURT:

Let me interrupt both of you here.

MR. MCKAY:

Okay.

THE COURT:

First, Chad, you have not brought up the

legal implications or questions that might surround the blood
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draw.

You had another motion but it didn't affect that blood

draw at al 1

.

MR, MCKAY:
You knoi v

Well, we brought: it: up in the prelim,..

i

i inderstai id :i ng

THE COURT:

'

' •

' ' •

Well

MR.. MCKA Y.

-.-.. - .•=•-.-

.;-pres.;.on '

hearing?
THE COUR T,

" \1 I 1 m '" iiupiesijioti hearing --

M S . BEATON:

Wait,

THE COURT:

.

MR. MCKAY:
1

r i a

I

" I " ! . 11

Right,

' h it •.'!."" I

THE COURT:
"hevJiei;

Do you

--

brought up,

We were just saving it for

• " '

''

Well, but It's a legal griestion as to

i i M.M- I h» > uiuou ,JI aw is proper.

.:*d nri opportunity
•...-.".;

You see, if he had

• • take a test, that legally can cuiue ±

.=.; T s a -

!;.nk a very sta**

a ~*lea:

statutory provision that, you can just mention that ne
refused, bcisical 1. >r,

IT it i t; you ' re going to contest the

'/alidity of the blood draw, that is iiuc a jury Question.
That is d judge question.
MR. MCKAY:
THE COURT:

YThb„
._..,,

All I'm saying is that -i

S l

^o

be heard

the hearing of the jurcijj, and this is a heck

•'

outside
be

I >r. ijiy iny it up.
MS. BEATON:

And frankly. -;he state's in a position
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where because we had a motion hearing and because of what had
happened at the preliminary hearing and there was some
suggestion that Mr. McKay thought that this was improper, I
actually sent him over a copy of UHP's policy regarding when
they'll do forced blood draws, anticipating that that's the
motion we're going to get.

Then I figure, okay, he's looked

at the issue and decided under State versus Rodriguez that
this was an appropriate situation for a forced blood draw.
He brings up a different issue at the suppression hearing and
until today is the first time I here that he wants to hash
this out in front of a jury and suggest that there's
something improper by it. And I think if he's going to
suggest that there's something improper, which he may very
well be able to do as a factual matter in front of a jury, I
ought to be able to defend it by saying this is exactly
(unintelligible) -THE COURT:
jury.

No.

I'm not going to let it go to the

It isn't a jury question, it's a legal question.

Whether that blood draw is purely a legal question.

It is

not a matter to be heard by the jury, unless I allow it to
come in, then you can raise it if we get past the first
hurdle.
MR. MCKAY:

Yeah.

And all I'm saying is, your

Honor, she -THE COURT:

But you can only then -- you know, I'd
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instruct them that the blood draw is legal, basically, that
/mi kuo"

MII

Id In' | ln» nil i] aile

MI ILMIUSJ'MJI,

ji | determine it-

is a legal blood draw.

.'

MR. MCKAi: ,
THE COURT:

J

-I don't know

I'riSR that" .lutiinr i v.ij i M

lm

I haven't reviewed the

i

I ong tnnu.

I know there I

n e some very limited circumstances where they can draw blood
i r. nrn a I")'H ^j^pect where he's in an emergency room as a
result of an accident, for example, I think there.are some

I
I'iSes that have held they can draw there for medical
purposes, and then it can be used for a DUI process, but id •
t'xceptioi is are pretty limited, as I recall.

I

Brenda, what is your take on what the law
•:

3 i 1 :i tl: :i =

-- . - 0 0 a uz.'i,•'.•-.'

MS. BEATON:

I

Bill has this l^suo •'h- '

111 id I have been talking about this issue.
Rodriguez is the case that define"

Stare ver^-.

-: * h^r »"M M* d .1 M < »«"xl

draw can be taken in an 2 nstance .i J ice t-his.
Lhey did in Rodriguez; was, they foiM-

-<.

Because what
• • ;- • .
- ••

woman who had refused all the field s-obrieuies and a :-"':•
same sort of circumstances that we5 re de • " •••-.-'

• -re

.although they didn't have an evading that proceedeo '*
the Court then lists ail thesp different fac

:

guess my problem is 1
Digitized
by the Howard W.
Law Library,
Clark Law School,
BYU.draw on that
THE
COURT:
BiHunter
it it
was J.aReuben
forced
blood
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occasion?
MS. BEATON:
THE COURT:

It was.
And it wasn't at -- it wasn't for a

medical exigency then?
MS. BEATON: No,
THE COURT:

Well, you see, I would be need to review

MS. BEATON:

But the court did determine that there

that —

was an exigency as a result of the facts and circumstances
involving that.

But I guess my feeling is that although I

happen to know the case that is on point, I haven't read the
whole case.

I just pulled the case and handed it to Bill the

other day because he's got some issue, but I haven't read it
and I'm not prepared to make this legal argument today.

And,

frankly, I think if the Court wants to make that argument
first we have got to have a full hearing.
THE COURT:

We've got to have a hearing on that

MR. MCKAY:

Your Honor, I'm not trying to skew

issue.

anything but the only thing I was thinking is if she's going
to bring up any evidence at all about his alcohol, she's got
to get that in somehow.

And the way that she's got to get it

in I think is to, you know, have the officer testify that
they took the blood and present the evidence and that's when
it would come up by way of defense that I believe it was
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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•jive t: hren s p e c i f i c r e a s o n s why

:'!X;roDeriv taicen ana .1

..dees
*

-iC "i z e e 4"
.

-. ~-y f a c t u a l l y -based

•act or: tore

i ssue
THE COURT:

Bu t ihat's a i - - v • r\J.o
T

- • I Y A r

: • |- • ,3

oht

>- - -"7

„«-L'. i.- O O -.

=a-

are willing

v conp-.^ei che results 01 a bloou

..-v •. dxegy ...ci * .. - n n s e and then argue
shonldiru give u

:.r:iat, you

r'":y leal weight

.roumstances, wn.i>.h . s what you'd like 1 I

' d u:

J';, you .. •- r;o'-ng "----- have <: o weigh that legal quest'-'
3<\:\>. .
I

resolvec
.j

.: ;

;. ...op

TlTr

i going to insist r:vp. : tOO

outside the hearing of the - • y uii ct '" ;~' •

J O ' - O

I

^neiwise,

i o n ,

T "F

^ O U

TiTanf

f- /•>

"j p +-

- —

M R . MCKAY

wvv-j-j.,

j^u. --

THE COUR*l

-- and then raise the problem, y- o
;

• oe righr J-Q appeal the admissibij-i'

' -'o > •:: ••

;ci.:i .;../ argue +:o th- iury ""hen w; :.-=?: weight do you want.
~o give

_.

^uu adiiiissibiJ.1 ty is a it ;

;'•'--•- *

" J .;ive up your argument that it was illegally rh on:
j

":u can argue that, you know, the oprc .--?:- -'- • p.?

-,-•

.1.

;

:o overzealous po 1 i ce work that was oeirig done against yo.

i

-iient t--> his detriment, or wha r ••-••

•

v

.-:

r

n-aer sta.ua .3 basically that based on /our previous

^ _

••'"-•v. thr previous ioot::"i: •:-.,•:' ; denied, then, _-..-u know,
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that's a strategy I guess you'd have to live with.

But your

client would not be able to appeal the admissibility if we
let the jury hear it all and then you bring in all the
circumstances.

Otherwise, it's a pure legal question I have

to decide outside the hearing of the jury.
MR. MCKAY:

Why does it — you know, I just as

THE COURT:

And then if I let it in, you can get the

soon --

circumstances in.

if I deny it, then it's a nonissue see.

MR. MCKAY:

I just assume we do it during the trial.

THE COURT:

You would waive the admissibility of the

results of the blood draw?
MR. MCKAY:

No.

I was going to make an

objection and state the legal reasons why —
THE COURT:

That's the point I'm saying.

If you

want to —
MR. MCKAY:

Right.

THE COURT:

-- if you're going to object to the

admissibility —

it isn't the jury that's going to decide

whether it's admissible, it's —

the judge has to.

It's a

legal question.
MR. MCKAY:

Yeah.

But I think I could probably —

unless the Court limits me, I can probably still get that
evidence into the jury for a different reason.
THE COURT:

I mean --

Well, you might -- you might be able
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1 : :>
•MR.

i

Whether they followed the procedures or

THE COURT:

-- *-

MR. MCKAY:

- _.- .3 evidence --

.;h^ws r i •-* intent

THF

m: {hit be able to get some

evidence in on
• ._ .•

:'

' • * -is far •-.••* ndmi ssibility of a test,

.....

.

:r.-. ^ a i u L O makes certain provisions

:i now r.he Court — m admit the results of a test that is
. •*;..

,o

yzer or

y^i Vrow, the blood alcohol

•; est ing equipment t- ha t i ? •: s -°d .
MR. MCKA:
- aying that

^y^e 1 a^n't understand.

that's an option that they not?

" •.. -

If I say libal I

. ..; .ney not present that evidence.

: -rove their -:ase without that evidence?

Are you

How do they

Maybe I" m jn i st :i :i : 't

. ::.sta:.u: ug v;r.at you're saying.
MS. BEATON:

The j u d a e

THE COUR1
i^^.iu.'

.,

. . n-

i can s ;vir :

-•

—

- - -- 'W

•

• • , ~:ge o u t s : !•=> • ; .

l

therefore,

^ a > '•*•

t^hen all of the circumstances are

orobably ~f"-ing to O c coming m .
-se i-;.

:

j . L h i S o i - o i l i t y ••! i . A'. :---:=* , a n d

". :ias t : ;-.e rieci >* i i \ - - /-

i -• s u q g e s H n < { t-hiat

E l :Iei ly

.ssue, y?u may open the door for them to get it in

:: certain ways
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MR. MCKAY:

Yeah,

THE COURT:

-- if you're careful on how you raise

it, it may not, you know, but what I'm saying, it becomes a
nonissue as to whether or not there was a blood draw.
MR. MCKAY:

I guess if you rule that it doesn't come

in, then they can't prove their case.
THE COURT:

I don't know.

MR. MCKAY:

If you rule that it does come in, then

all she has to do is (unintelligible) -THE COURT:

They've got two options —

two options under the law.

they've got

If I don't allow the test in then

their other option is to prove that he was appreciably
impaired because of the consumption of alcohol or drugs -MR. MCKAY:

Okay.

THE COURT:

—

MS. BEATON:

and not safe to drive.

Even though I also have the refusal

presumption which is I can then argue consciousness or guilt.
THE COURT: Yeah.
MS. BEATON:

But I guess the problem that I'm having

is here, I came today thinking because he had not raised this
issue, because he had mentioned it at the prelim, and he
apparently decided not to raise it at the suppression
hearing, that it was coming in.

We were --he believed that

it was -- under the law it was appropriate so he did not want
to challenge it and so I could talk about the fact that test
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came back,

"I've given him notice of expert, I've sent over

i 'Vs , r'" '(•••» done ..Ml sorts ol: things L u indicate to him at
least what my game plan was.
He and f. ha"" n-* ! diked a .tew di tterent times, and until
today is the first time hearing that now all of a sudden •
»o " re going I <,» loilk about iorced bJoud di aw and we're going
to, you know, make it seem like it's a big deal and all -THE COUR'I :
M S . BEATON:
THE COURT" i

I '< "I I -•• • this kinda thing.
-- T'm r^t so concerned about the

forcing of the blood draw and a^i ^f Lhat n
'jbjectioti to the test coming in.

Lhere it

Tf there : c an objection to

the test coming in, that's a legal question ±
outside the presence of the jury, and the ju^y uoesn • need
to hear al 1 the circumstances of it, then I ; /oi 1] d h a:1; ? e to
decide that.

II. doesn't sound like we're ready to go the

jury on that: issue for sure.
If you're going to object to the admissibility of the
test, then I'm going to have to have a special heaxlno ui i on
Moiny to have to tuJl.y hear this and review the law because,
you know, in our society in general y<»n don 't fc rce pe< :>ple t : •
yive blood to incriminate them criminally, unless you're
under one of the exceptions for a UNA
other purposes that are permitted.

some of tl le

And a person can refuse

to take the test and then J instruct them that there was a
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refusal to take a test and that's it, or that the evidence
will show there was a refusal, and that's where we stop.
Now, as far as you —

how far you go getting in the other

circumstances of forcing the blood draw and all is a
brand-new issue that I wasn't aware of, frankly.
hear the prelim.

I didn't

And I'm not sure --

MR. MCKAY:

It was my understanding that you were

going to review the prelim tape as part of the suppression
hearing.
MS. BEATON:

Yeah, but that wasn't the issue at the

suppression hearing.
THE COURT:

I -- I did.

MR. MCKAY:

It was an issue.

THE COURT:

But I think I had a --

MS. BEATON:
MR. MCKAY:

No, it wasn't.
Well, I mean as a practical matter, I

don't have to write out my entire case or defense for you so
you can prepare for every point -MS. BEATON:
MR. MCKAY:

Yes —
Just like I don't know every point

you're going to bring up.
THE COURT:

No.

But —

MR. MCKAY:

We've been through two

hearings already -THE COURT:

We're only talking about —
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MR. MCKAY:

it's not like this ^s new.

Till1"!,! 1701,11! I",

l-J'o're only talking about

MR, MCKAY:

You knew this was coming --

—

' THE COUR Ti! \ Je're only talking about the blood
alcohol

.
MS. BEATON:

But the bottom 1 ir.e is we don't have, a

trial today :i f yoi i're going to object uu Liie lib-cal
^idjoissibj l.Ity ot the blood draw because that i :?\ v something
that we just parade out in front of a •

someth I rig

rr

ua!: -s something that i J~

that we al 1 get to write briefs ~n

the Court rules against the state i •

:/ H-:j rrn

appealable issue for me, it might be an appealable issue
yOU

t0

g0

Up

Qn.

THE COURT:

•

Yeah

I'-

" m not going to just go

-.rid give Uiat whole thir-;

-

- •• -

. nstruct them what's admissible ana w:.ai; isn't,
MR. MCKM
MS. BEATON:

..

:<.-. e n t J.y.

And maybe this whole conversation

needs -THE COURT:
would do -MS. BEATON:

And that's what you apparently assumed I
\
(i unintelligible) Is m u t e t h e n

b e c a u s e t h e d^f o n 111 \ i (i in i ntel 1 i g i b I w) sI JOW > 11 >,
MR. MCKAY:

1 eah , 1 mean, my whole case Is baseu
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THE COURT:

You apparently assumed I would do that.

MR, MCKAY:

Yeah.

My whole case is based on

improper conduct, and obviously that includes everything from
when he started to —
THE COURT:

Uh-huh.

with you doing that.

I don't have any problem, Chad,

I don't have any problem --

MR. MCKAY:

That's all I'm saying --

THE COURT:

-- with you doing everything you can to

defend your client to the fullest regarding police conduct
that might affect their bias or prejudice in testifying
against your client or their credibility, those are fine
issues to raise.

It's just -- we've got a legal issue here

on the admissibility that is not a jury question, it's a law
question.

And if I allow it in, that probably opens the

gates for you, but if I deny it, that means they're not going
to get their test in.

And they'd better decide whether they

want to pursue it under the only remaining element, and that
is impaired to the degree he couldn't safely operate so that
limits what they can present then.
MR. MCKAY:

Well, that's your decision, your Honor.

THE COURT:

Well, that is and that's how I have to

rule on it.
MS. BEATON:
then.

Well, I guess let'sj releasei the jury

If the defendant is not here, the state' s going to ask

for a bench warrant.
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I don't, know

MS. BEATON:

Ami I duu'l

THE COURT:

3
4

THE CLERK:

MS. BEATON:

6

THE COURT:

7

MS. BEATON:

9

I'm HI/ huw that --

Mr. Cornejo isn't going anywhere.

Hell

he's been around long enough to get seven DUIs, you say?

5

8

-

Yeah.
He's going to s^cV: around.
It's the Christmas season, he'lL

. •jct:;i. :,v_ _;-...;„: and driving again.
warrant i:

State wants a bench

""••- doesn't show at the time of trial.

THE COURT:

Wei 1

T

'n"! give Mr-. :>ic> ay time to get

him in for sure if he has to ••
MS. BEATON:

Well

' 'oaay D-Day, though?

I

mean, he doesn't know that w e ! v
MR. MCKAY:

As far as j. -;• .: • --

THE COURT:

I '"II i I P O i d p 1 lial

i s he in there now

I don't know.•
r.

MR. MCKAY:
THE COURT:
Lo give Mr
arrested

i '-vim ' n I ' ,<M dei i i h,t

.

McKay a cue-:'

J
(j

~u.

':.

, /: going ::o
*

1
: go

•:..-:•

He's shown up for his other hearings.
THE CLERK:

The defendant

THE COURT;

Tie is?

is her e.

.THE CLERK:
THE COURT:

's a nonissue there.

'foing to have to add :•--;- > tiiis other issue.

j

But we're

We got a couple
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of options.

We could ask this jury —

jurors to go to trial yet?

do we have enough

Did you --

THE CLERK:

I think one more showed up.

THE COURT:

Let's turn this off now and we'll --

(A discussion was held off the record.)
THE CLERK:

Okay.

On the record.

THE COURT:

Okay.

This is back to the case of State

versus Cornejo.
I've determined that there is enough -- enough -- there
are enough jurors that we could try this case and they are
available.

And I have also ruled that the admissibility of

the blood drawn from the defendant is a legal question that
this Court would have to rule on after an evidentiary hearing
or a proffer of exactly what the evidence is and a review of
the legal questions that surround that issue, and it was not
raised prior to today.
As this record will show, Mr. McKay indicated that he
intended to -- as a part of his strategy in trying the case,
that he intended to allow the state to proceed to show the
evidence that surrounded this blood draw and that could be
done in the presence of the jury and then he would object to
the admissibility of the evidence after the state has
attempted to lay its foundation to justify the admissibility
of that evidence.
This Court's not willing to go through that process in
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the presence of a jury given the fact that it may deny the
evidence and then that leaves the state with one element that
they would have to determine if they're going to try and
prove, and that is if the defendant was impaired so that he
could not safely operate a motor vehicle under the statute
and get a conviction.
So the admissibility of the blood test is a critical
element of the state's case.

And the state has indicated

they had previously given notice to Mr. McKay they intended
to put that in and they have their -- what is it a doctor
lined up —
MS, BEATON:
THE COURT:

Toxicologist.
-- or a technician, a toxicologist to

come in and testify about, I suppose, the blood draw and the
test itself.
MS. BEATON:
THE COURT:

And the result.
And the results and asserting that there

is a blood alcohol level above the .08 grams, I suppose.
So that being the case, the state --or the Court has a
jury ready to go. Mr. McKay has indicated off the record,
and I want to make it a part of the record now that he is
ready to go to trial, his client is here and he wishes to go
to trial today on the issue and the state has objected to
going to trial today until the legal question of
admissibility by them can be resolved.

And I'd like to hear
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now from both of you to make a record concerning your
respective arguments.

Ms. Beaton, would you like to state

first what your position is concerning this.
MS. BEATON:

Yes, your Honor.

I believe earlier

that we had discussed that the Court is somewhat unfamiliar
with the issue, I'm unfamiliar with the issue, and apparently
Mr. McKay has not felt it was an issue that needed to be
brought up in a pretrial motion despite the fact that we've
already had a motion hearing.
The state feels like its at a disadvantage but because
it -- there was a mention of it at the preliminary hearing,
there was evidence that I actually sent over to defense
counsel to support the forced blood draw, and the fact that
it did not arise at the supression hearing as one of the
issues that defense counsel brought up, that it was not going
to be an issue.
The state has proceeded with this case as though that
evidence was coming in by sending notice of the expert,
sending a copy of the curriculum vitae in case defense
counsel didn't have it, although it is a state's witness and
that under the statute right now we're not expected to send
that, I sent that anyway, and also sent the lab results which
are also something that was submitted at the time of the
preliminary hearing so defense counsel had notice that the
state was planning on using that evidence.

The state has
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prepared its entire case on the premise that that evidence
would be included as testimony rather than we would have an
issue in front of the jury as to its admissibility.
The state's position is, is that if we're going to argue
this legal issue it's not something that can be readily done
this morning and then reconvene the jury this afternoon; one,
because research needs to be done by all three of the parties
involved in this; two, because it requires an evidentiary
hearing that requires the state to subpoena witnesses, some
of which have already been subpoenaed for the trial but
others of which the state would anticipate calling who are
not under subpoena by the state and whether or not their
availability is —

it is unknown at this point in time;

three, I think the state's position is, is that this is an
appealable issue, possibly by defense if the Court permits
the admissibility of the forced blood draw in and the
results; or two, that it would be situational possibly the
state could appeal this issue because it is so critical for
determining the DUI in this particular case.
The state also feels like this is a situation where the
law does not permit defense counsel or the state to conduct a
trial by ambush.

And we have had a preliminary hearing,

we've had a pretrial and we've had a supression hearing, all
of which none of those have indicated to the state that
defense counsel was going to object to this blood draw until
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today.
It's the state's position that this issue needs to be
resolved so I know when I make opening and closing and the
context of the questions in which I ask all of the witnesses
whether or not this type of evidence is going to come in or
whether or not the state's even going to be able to proceed
on the DUI depending upon what the ruling is. That decision
cannot be made today.

It needs to be fully briefed and the

state's position is, is that the trial has to be continued at
this point in time because we were not given proper notice as
permitted by the -- as indicated by the statute, notice
should be given to the party on admissibility-type issues 10
days prior to the trial beginning, that did not happen
despite the fact we actually had a supression hearing and
there was know even intimation at the supression hearing that
this was going to be the issue at trial.
THE COURT:

Now what section are you citing that

there has to be notice given in advance of trial as to his
objection to the admissibility?
MS. BEATON:

I think under the Rules of Civil

Procedure which apply pertaining to motions, I think it's
Rule 12, that indicates when motions should be filed and it
indicates 10 days prior to trial or as soon as practicable.
This issue has been an issue from the inception when
discovery was sent to defense counsel when this case was
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filed, it was brought up at the preliminary hearing, it was
not contested at the supression hearing and not mentioned as
any point of contention at any of the pretrials.

And today

the state was first informed by Mr. McKay that this was going
to be an issue right as we were standing out in the hallway
prior to the jury coming in.
THE COURT;

All right. Mr. McKay, would you like to

make a record and your -- regarding your position in this
matter.
MR. MCKAY:

Yes. Thank you, your Honor.

Throughout

this proceeding it's been fairly informal discovery.
cooperated, passed things back and forth.

We've

We haven't had

formal cut-off dates, we haven't had formal lists that have
gone out, we haven't even supplied each other with witness
lists.

I mean, it's been very informal.

not required in this case.

Proper notice is

Because for me to -- and as the

Court knows, I'm not required to show all of my case to the
prosecution, basically write out here, this is everything I'm
going to do, you go ahead and prepare a response to every
single thing, that's just not what the law requires.
The fact that in fact she sent the discovery to me that
she brought up, particularly what she's referring to are the
procedures for a forcible blood draw shows that it did come
up in the preliminary hearing —

in fact, I don't think she

was the one that did the prelim, I think it was Camille.
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MS. BEATON:

MR. MCKAY:

No.

I was.

Anyway, it did come up in the

preliminary hearing in front of Judge Jones.
MS. BEATON: Jones.
MR. MCKAY:

And that's why they sent the discovery

to me, so they knew that it was an issue but it's up to me as
to when I bring that in as part of my strategy.
Certainly if the Court's going to require that I divulge
every single objection that I'm going to make in this case
ahead of time so they can prepare case law and defenses and
responses to it, that's not the way the law works.

I mean,

I'm not required to -- and she's not required to show me her
entire case either.

I don't know what her witnesses are

going to say unless I take depositions, which usually, as the
Court knows, isn't done in criminal cases. You know, I don't
know how she can claim that she wasn't aware of this issue.
Obviously she was, she sent me discovery on it.

It's up to

me as to when I bring that in as part of the case.
I have done my research, but I was bringing it up mostly
as a procedural issue that the -- it's very fact sensitive
that did the police officer follow the procedures required
for the forcible blood draw, yes or no.
what it's about.

And that's really

Her witness is here, he can testify as to

whether he followed those procedures or didn't follow the
procedures, and that's really all we're saying.
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the legal issue that the Court will rule on, but did he
follow the procedures, and I believe the trier of facts can
follow those points, yes or no. And that's -- you know, we
believe he did violate them on at least three particulars but
it's up to the Court to rule whether that's —
One other thing, and maybe this is just a legend that
passes around among the defense bar, but most defense
attorneys --my brother was a prosecutor and a judge and
they, at least in Arizona, prosecutors will not try cases
during December because they believe jurors for the will of
the season or whatever it is are more lenient.

And for that

matter -MS. BEATON:
MR. MCKAY:

Now wait a minute,
-- it would be prejudicial to my client

not to have the trial in the month of December but to bump it
off to when all the debts hit in February.
THE COURT:
MS. BEATON:

Well -That's a bunch of crap.

MR. MCKAY:

Whether it carries weight or not --

THE COURT:

Just a minute.

MR. MCKAY:

—

THE COURT:

Yeah.

MR. MCKAY:

—

Just a minute.

I'm just telling you that's an

argument
That's —

that's --

that it does tend to -- I mean,

prosecutors don't think about it but --

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

28

THE COURT:

Well, that -- that's —

MR. MCKAY:

- we do think about it.

MS, BEATON:

So you (unintelligible) in December?

THE COURT:

-- may be a fiction or not --

MR. MCKAY:

No.

THE COURT:

That may be a fiction but it doesn't

really matter.

I do.

I've got a jury out here ready to go to

trial.
MR. MCKAY:
MS. BEATON:

I think we should do it.
I mean, I think it's an insult against

me and I want the Court to say that that's a bunch of crap.
There is no way that that even factors in.
THE COURT: No.
MS. BEATON:

I would try him on the 24th of

December,
MR. MCKAY:

I apologize if you're offended by that,

that wasn't what I meant by it.
THE COURT:

I'm just saying --

Well, that's -- that's a nonissue.

Let's not even discuss it anymore.
MR. MCKAY:

I apologize.

THE COURT:

This jury —

this jury will decide the

case based upon the merits, I'm sure.
MR. MCKAY:

I'm sure they will.

THE COURT: And whether they're charitable because
it's Christmastime
or angry because they've already run up
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their credit card debt it doesn't matter.
MR. MCKAY:

Or that they need to be shopping instead

of here listening to the case.
THE COURT:

Yeah.

Christmas that it's —

And we're far enough before

it's totally a nonfactor.

However, I do think it's an important legal issue, that
is my -- that's my concern on Ms. Beaton's side, it is an
important legal issue.
were coming —

Strategically I understand where you

are coming from and it isn't your obligation

totally to object in advance through motions in limine.

The

problem is as a judge in managing the trial, I have to make
sure that it's done right and that the proper evidence gets
before the jury and the improper evidence doesn't get before
the jury.

It's a question of law as to whether or not under

certain facts a blood draw is permitted and then the evidence
obtained therefrom can be used by the prosecution.
I have to also factor in how difficult it is for me to
find trial dates for two days even, you know, to get cases
tried because we're heavily calendared and we've set aside
this date for the jury trial and I don't like to give up my
trial dates.
can.

I have to use as many days for the trials as I

I'm going to rule as follows:

We're going ahead with this trial today and I'm going to
excuse the jury until 1:30, we're going to have a hearing on
the legal and factual issues relating to this.
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about 15 minutes to 10, we'll start that immediately, the
witnesses are here for that part of it, I suppose.
MS. BEATON:

You know, the sergeant is the one who

authorized this and he's not even under subpoena.
THE COURT:

Well, I can't control totally those

issues but I am going to have the evidentiary hearing as to
what happened, and I may be fairly liberal on allowing who
said they could do what.
MS. BEATON:

To get the facts in --

Your Honor, the state feels like it's

out of point then and it's going to dismiss and refile.
THE COURT: No.
MS. BEATON:

I mean, I think this is a serious

issue -THE COURT:

I'm not going to allow you to refile.

MS. BEATON:

I don't think you get an option to

say that -THE COURT:

I do. We're going to trial today on

this case and we will follow that procedure and I'll have the
hearing.

Then I'm going to —
MS. BEATON:
THE COURT:

But, Judge —
—

review the law myself and I'll allow

you two to go to your offices and fax to me or get to me any
cases that you think are relevant on the issue and I'll make
a decision and we will start the trial at 1:30.
ahead.

That's all.
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MS. BEATON:

When are we going to have the

evidentiary hearing?
THE COURT:

Right now.

MR. MCKAY:

Do we need to go over the instructions?

THE COURT: Not now.
MR. MCKAY:

Okay.

THE COURT:

I'm going to excuse the jury for --

until 1:30, have them come back and then we're going to go
ahead and try this case.
(The following was held in open court.)
THE COURT:

Ladies and Gentlemen of the Jury panel,

you've been summoned in today to hear a case that is going to
go for today and tomorrow, a criminal case. And we have
determined -

or I have determined this morning that there

are some issues that are purely legal that I need to resolve
with the parties before we actually proceed with the trial.
Now, that being the case, I'm going to take the rest of
this morning to resolve those legal questions that exist.
And I'm going to have the jury panel come back at 1:30 and we
will proceed with the trial. We still should be able to be
done by tomorrow evening.
Now, the only question I'm going to ask any of you right
now is are there any of you who have a —

an extremely dire

emergency of some sort that would prevent you from being
involved with the court for the next two days?
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we will talk with you about when we get to the empaneling
process this afternoon.
But if there are any of you, for example, who have
emergency situations, immediate family members in dire crisis
in the hospital or something like that or something extremely
serious, including tickets to go to Maui that you bought six
months ago or something.

But anyone that has other than the

normal busyness of work and of this time of the year, please
raise your hand and let me know and we may be able to discuss
and resolve that issue.

Otherwise, we would expect you back

here at 1:30 this afternoon.
I see no hands and so I take it then that though you're
not too comfortable with having to come back and delay the
start, I understand that.

It's a matter that I have to

resolve outside the presence of the jury and you always get
those kinds of things, and I'll do that before we actually
even empanel a jury and we'll see you back here then at
1:30 this afternoon.

Thank you.

And we're going to ask all

of you now to leave the courtroom while we have this hearing
that we're going to have to proceed with.
(The prospective jurors leave the courtroom.)
THE COURT:

Ms. Beaton, do you have —

do you need a

few minutes to gather things together and be ready to
proceed?
MS. BEATON:

I need more than a few minutes, your
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Honor, I think you've already heard what the state's position
is.

That's the problem that we're having here.

The state

feels like it's not prepared, this is an issue that the
Court's already indicated it's not prepared for so I don't
know why -THE COURT:
issue.

Well, I'm not going to reargue that

I just want to know how many witnesses you're going

to need to call, who they are and let's see if we can help
you to get them here as soon as possible.
MS. BEATON:

Well, I need two witnesses right now,

one witness who is not even under subpoena which is the
sergeant who authorized this.
THE COURT:

Well, that one perhaps I can allow in

through a hearsay basis but let's -- the other witness, when
were they due?
MS. BEATON:

Well, the other witness obviously is

going to be the trooper.
THE COURT:
MS. BEATON:

Okay.
So he's here.

But problem is that the

state has is I don't know what the -- I haven't even had a
discussion with Brad H o m e as to what the mental thoughts
were that he was having when he instructed Trooper Jones to
make sure that a forced blood draw takes place.
THE COURT:
MS. BEATON:

All right.
But troo — but Sergeant H o m e is the
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one that actually authorizes and makes that decision.

1
2

THE COURT:

Okay.

3

I

MS. BEATON:

Now I don't even know whether or not

4

I these two gentlemen even had a conversation as to what the

5

rationale was for this.

6

because I'm not even given 10 minutes to talk to my officers

7

to find out.

8

THE COURT:

9

I'm only guessing as to what that is

Do you believe --do you believe it is a

subjective rather than objective standard?

10

MS. BEATON:

I —

I don't know what's going into it.

11

I don't know if they're making objective determinations or

12

subjective determinations.

13

says to even tell the Court what exactly all the factors are.

14

I

THE COURT:

I don't even know what Rodriguez

You're going to trial on it and you were

15

supposed to be ready to present the evidence and show this

16

Court how it's admissible, Ms. Beaton.

17

I

18
19

I think the state's position is,

though, as I've already indicated, I did not think we were
I going to have an admissibility of this issue come to bear

20
21

MS. BEATON:

because defense counsel -J

THE COURT:

You have to anticipate it in every

22

prosecution.

23

have an evidentiary hearing.

24
25

I'll take a 15 minute recess and then we will

The Court's in recess.
(A recess was taken.)
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THE CLERK:

For the record we'll call State of Utah

versus Oscar Ivan Cornejo, case number 041900798.
THE COURT:
MS. BEATON:

All right.

The state may proceed.

Your Honor, if I may, the —

I have

pulled the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.
THE COURT: Uh-huh.
MS. BEATON:

Rule 12 under motions.

THE COURT: Uh-huh.
MS. BEATON:

It indicates the following shall be

raised at least five days prior to trial, this is subsection
C, sub 1, sub B, which indicates that, A motion to suppress
evidence shall be —

shall be brought before the court at

least five days prior to trial.

Subsection A indicates, An

application to a court for an order shall be by motion,
which, unless made during the trial or hearing, shall be in
writing and in accordance with this rule. A motion shall
state succinctly and with particularity the grounds upon
which it is made and the relief sought.

A motion need not be

accompanied by a memorandum unless required by the Court.
The state's position is, is that this motion has -- is
requesting a supression of evidence of the admissibility of
the blood draw and it should have been raised at least five
days prior to trial and has not been raised five days to
trial.

The state is not prepared to go forward today and is

not prepared on this legal issue.
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The state does not as a practical matter believe that
defense counsel or the Court is prepared to go forward on
this very serious legal issue.

It's highly judgmental to the

state's case if this evidence is not admitted, and it is the
state's continuing motion that this hearing be rescheduled
for a different day —
THE COURT:
MS, BEATON:

Okay.
-- so all of the parties may have an

ample opportunity in order to conduct the legal research and
the writing and motions that are necessary at least
contemplated by the rules, the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedures, Rule 12.
THE COURT:

I'm denying that request to continue.

MS. BEATON:

Your Honor, then at this point the

state -THE COURT:

The state is prepared -- must be

prepared when they have a trial set to proceed to present
their evidence and have legal basis for that to come in.

If

a defendant objects at a trial, then the Court has to make
the ruling that it is proper.

And then if I make a mistake

in the ruling, of course, that can be appealed, but the rules
are that both parties when there's a trial scheduled need to
be prepared to support, as a matter of law, any evidence that
they intend to present.
MS. BEATON:

Well --
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THE COURT:

It's your burden, not the defense's

burden to be certain that the evidence is admissible.
MS. BEATON:

Well, even if it's my burden, under

this scenario, Rule 12 required me to file something in
writing which I have not done, which I am prepared to do.
THE COURT: Well, that's not the way I read it so
you can go ahead and —
MS* BEATON:

Your Honor, at this time the state

moves to dismiss.
THE COURT:

Denied.

This jury is here to try this

case.
MS. BEATON:
THE COURT:

Your Honor, with all due respect -If I dismiss —

let me say, I may

admit -- I may allow that but it would be with prejudice.
MS. BEATON:

Your Honor, I've also --

THE COURT:

We're ready to go to trial.

MS. BEATON:

-- looked at that. Rule 25 indicates

the dismissal without trial, when that can be done and
whether or not it can be done with prejudice.

The only

option that would apply is whether or not the Court believes
that there is unconstitutional delay in bringing the
defendant to trial. And I believe as we've indicated early I
don't think that the Court can make a finding that the state
is trying to delay this matter for no reason.
The state wants to be prepared on this legal issue
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because it is going to other affect whether or not we're
permitted to appeal, whether or not defense counsel is
permitted to appeal, and it's obviously a critical factor in
this junction of the case.
THE COURT:

How much time have you had notice that

this trial has been scheduled?
MS. BEATON:
THE COURT:
MS. BEATON:

This is actually -Several weeks.
This is actually the first time that

this case has been set for trial. We actually have a second
trial date already scheduled because there was going to be a
trial of mine that was going to bump this trial.
THE COURT:
MS. BEATON:

But this case was set on -This case was set for trial on

October 18th, 2004.
THE COURT: Uh-huh.
MS. BEATON:

With a pretrial on November 8th.

And

then there was an alternative trial date set on November 15th
because I notified defense counsel and the Court immediately
when I believed that the Daryl Anderson case was going to go
and that it was going to trump this matter.
And the state is prepared as a practical matter to go
forward today.

The only issue is, is we did not think that

this would be an issue the admissibility of this evidence
given the fact we'd already had a supression hearing and
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

39

defense counsel did not bring that issue at the supression
hearing,
THE COURT:

Nor did the state ever bring it before

the Court,
MS. BEATON:
THE COURT:

I agree.
We're going to go to trial today, that's

denied,
MS. BEATON:
THE COURT:

Your Honor -If I dismiss it, it would have to be

upon your agreement to dismiss with prejudice, I can do that.
MS. BEATON:

I think the one thing that I get to do

is I get to dismiss this case if I want to as part of the
executive branch.

The Court has the liberty then to

determine if it's going to be a dismissal with prejudice but
the state would ask for findings that it's being made based
on unconstitutional delay.
THE COURT:
possibly be.

It isn't.

I'm just — well, it could

But I -- what I'm saying is the parties are

here, ready for trial, you should be prepared to go to trial
today and you've had ample notice of this trial date.

And I

am -- the defense has mentioned in chambers they want the
trial today, they're here ready to go, and so we'll either
have the trial today or you can move to dismiss it without
prejudice —

or with prejudice.

MS. BEATON:

I — with all due respect to the Court,
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I don't think that you get to tell me whether or not I move
for dismissal with prejudice.
THE COURT:

Well, you can move for dismissal but I'm

denying the motion.
MS. BEATON:

I -- I think I get to do that.

As the

executive branch, I get to decide whether or not the charges
are going to be filed or dismissed.

You can deny it but the

denial has to -- I ask for findings then supporting it based
on unconstitutional delay, because I don't think —
THE COURT:

I'm denying your motion because this

case has been set for trial, the defendant is here ready to
proceed, and on the day of trial, it's not a timely motion.
MS. BEATON:

But defense counsel is the one that is

trying to suppress the evidence, your Honor.
THE COURT:

They are only objecting to the

admissibility of evidence, Ms. Beaton.
MS. BEATON:
THE COURT:
MS. BEATON:

If it's —
They have that right.
-- suppressed evidence that had been

admitted at the preliminary hearing.

The rules

specifically -THE COURT:
MS. BEATON:

Do you want to have the trial today?
I don't want to have the trial today

because this legal issue is pending.
THE COURT:

Well, let's resolve it now then.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

You

41

may present the evidence concerning this blood draw and I'll
make a decision on whether it's admissible.
MS. BEATON:

I

But I think what the Court -- what the

state is saying, your Honor, is the state is not prepared to
make this legal argument today.

Because if the Court denies

the admissibility of this evidence —
THE COURT:

That's your problem, Ms. Beaton, not

mine.
MS. BEATON:
THE COURT:

I -I have to rule correctly on it no

matter what.
MS. BEATON:

I agree. And I think that you will

rule correctly on it but I want -- I want the ability to at
least file a written motion to indicate to you why I think
that this evidence is admissible.

I also have a difficulty

because the sergeant who authorized this is on his way to
Soda Springs, Idaho where he has business, where he —
THE COURT:

I would be very liberal in you

presenting any evidence concerning the circumstances of
this -MS. BEATON:
THE COURT:
MS. BEATON:

I understand that, your Honor -—

blood draw.

— but I really feel like the state is

not prepared to go forward.
THE COURT:

And so what are you going to do?
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want to —
MS. BEATON:
THE COURT:

The state is going to dismiss.
You move to dismiss and I would have to

dismiss it with prejudice.

How about the other charges?

This is the DUI charge we're dealing with on this one.
MS. BEATON:

The state cannot --is not going to

proceed with a portion of this case.

The state is going to

proceed with all of this case at the same time.
THE COURT:

You're moving to dismiss knowing that if

I dismiss I'm going to do that with prejudice?
MS. BEATON:

And the state requests legal findings

from you as to why.
THE COURT:

Well, because it's an untimely motion.

I'll hear from defense.

What is your position?

Let's make a

record here.
MR. MCKAY:

We agree with the Court.

ready to go to court.

We're here

We made all the arguments in chambers

as to why and why not. We would ask that if that's their
choice to dismiss that the Court do dismiss with prejudice as
we're, you know, being brought in here, everybody is required
to be here.

If the tables were turned and it were the

defense making this motion, I'm certain that the Court would
rule the same way.
THE COURT:

Thank you, your Honor.
Now, as I understand the issue, the

question,
the sole question that is the basis for your motion
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is this Court's dealing with the admissibility of the test
that was blood drawn after the defendant refused to give a
test, is that correct, Ms. Beaton?
give a test when —

after he had been stopped and arrested?

MS. BEATON:
THE COURT:

The defendant refused to

He did.
And the facts as I was told in

chambers -- and by the way, I have never been asked to review
the record of the preliminary hearing, because the only thing
I was asked to review was the videotape of the officer when I
denied your motion to suppress, so the record's clear on
that.
MR. MCKAY:

Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT:

And I had no indication until this

morning that there was even an issue concerning the test, and
at that time there was some discussion in a chambers about
the nature of the test.

But my understanding is from what

was discussed in chambers is that the defendant was stopped
for a traffic violation, and I think as I recall, he pulled
out onto the road, made a wide turn and the officer followed
him for some distance with his light on, got up by Adams and
25th, was it, somewhere?
MR. MCKAY:

Twenty-sixth (inaudible).

THE COURT:

Somewhere around Adams.

And that the

stop then took place after the officer forced him off the
road in a snow storm, so that's all I saw.

And I denied your
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motion to suppress because I felt that the officer was acting
totally proper in doing what he did under the circumstances.
So the issue of the blood test has never been raised before
in front of me, but apparently it was raised and objected to
at the preliminary hearing; is that correct?
MR. MCKAY:
MS. BEATON:

Yes, your Honor.
No.

We entered -- we entered some

questioning of Trooper Jones that suggested that defense
counsel didn't like the way it had happened but there was not
an objection -THE COURT:

Okay.

I see.

But circumstances of that

blood test were given in the preliminary hearing to some
detail.
MS. BEATON:
THE COURT:

Criticized.
And then some questions were asked by

the defense attorney as part of his strategy in finding out
whether there was a voluntary blood test given.

But in any

event, this blood test everybody concedes was not voluntarily
given; is that correct?
MS. BEATON:

Right.

MR. MCKAY:

That's correct, your Honor.

THE COURT:

And there was some comment that the --

somebody came to draw the blood, I'm sure the officer didn't
draw the blood, it had to be a technician of some sort. And
I would Digitized
assume
then a technician was called and when he was
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taken or Mr. Cornejo was asked to lift his arm he lift his
arm and they drew the blood.

He wasn't physically struggling

but he had objected to giving a test.

Is that a correct

summary of then what happened?
MS, BEATON:

Yes, your Honor.

MR. MCKAY:

Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT:

All right. And also Ms. Beaton gave to

the defense attorney the vitae of the blood technician
showing that she considered his proper qualifications to draw
blood and then to have it examined, and the testing
procedures, she had already given information to the defense
about what she was going to do in that regard, is that
correct, Mr. McKay?
MR. MCKAY:

You know, I don't recall receiving a

curriculum vitae but she did send to me the procedures that
they follow.
THE COURT:

And you're not arguing that --

MR. MCKAY:

That she wasn't qualified, no, your

THE COURT:

-- that the technician wasn't qualified?

MR. MCKAY:

No.

THE COURT:

And Ms. Beaton, what other information

Honor.

was given to the defense so we make a good record here about
your intent to try and show —
What else did you do?

or to get the blood test in?

You sent the curriculum vitae of the
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technician and a copy, I suppose, of the results of the blood
test?
MS. BEATON:

And a copy of the results were given

to the --to defense counsel prior to the preliminary
hearing.
THE COURT:
MS. BEATON:

Sometime ago.
The results were admitted into the

preliminary hearing and they were discussed at that time.
THE COURT:

Okay.

And I'm assuming that the results

were more than .08 grams by weigh.
MS. BEATON:
THE COURT:

Point one six.
Point one six.

So you had that

information, Mr. McKay; is that correct?
MR. MCKAY:

That's right, your Honor.

THE COURT:

All right.

And it was simply your

strategy, Mr. McKay, as you stated in chambers, you were
going to let all of this come in except the results and you
were going to object to the results because you felt that it
was an improper blood draw, that they had no authority to
draw the blood, is that a —
MR. MCKAY:

That's correct —

THE COURT:

-- a brief summary?

MR. MCKAY:

— your Honor.

THE COURT:

And then you also wanted to get the

facts relating
to the relationship between the defendant and
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the officers that were involved and you were attempting to
attack the credibility of the officers because of the way
they conducted themselves toward your client, is that a fair
summary?
MR. MCKAY:

That's correct, your Honor.

As well as

the violations of their own procedures.
THE COURT:

So you were using it as a strategy to

show that aspect as well as objecting to the admissibility?
MR. MCKAY:

Correct, your Honor.

THE COURT:

And the reason you did not file a motion

to suppress this evidence was because it was part of your
strategy -MR. MCKAY:

That's correct, your Honor.

THE COURT:

--in doing that?

MR. MCKAY:

Right.

THE COURT:

State have anything further you want to

Just do it during the trial.

say that you haven't said already?
MS. BEATON:

I guess the state's position is then,

defense counsel can have all sorts of strategies if they
want, but if they want to actually have this Court suppress
evidence, it is required by Rule 12 that I actually receive
five days prior to trial written notice of that motion.

That

would have given all of us, if we would have had five days
notice, an opportunity to have researched the issue and
prepared to
have even argued it this morning.
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THE COURT:

All right.

MR. MCKAY:

Your Honor, itfs not that I was trying

to suppress the evidence but an objection —
MS. BEATON:
MR. MCKAY:

That's what you just said.
--to the evidence and to show that

factually they violated their own procedures in the process.
THE COURT:

But you were challenging its

admissibility which is similar to a motion but it was just
going to be done by an objection because you wanted the facts
surrounding the whole thing to come in.
MR. MCKAY:

Correct, your Honor.

THE COURT: Uh-huh.
MR. MCKAY:

Which is part of the strategy of the

THE COURT:

Okay.

MR. MCKAY:

As we mentioned in chambers, we're not

defense.

required to show them full hand if we're (inaudible).
THE COURT:

All right. Well, I -- I, again, deny

the state's motion to continue.
motion to continue the trial?

I assume you have first that

And then absent the court

granting that, you are moving to dismiss the case but you're
moving to dismiss it without prejudice4—
MS. BEATON:
THE COURT:
MS. BEATON:

Well, I guess —
—
—

so you can refile?
the state —

the state would like
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factual findings as to why the Court does not believe the
Rule 12 would apply in this case because the word "shall" is
used -THE COURT:

Well, it's a constitutional violation of

the defendant's rights in a DUI case possibly, although I
haven't fully researched it myself and would be prepared to
rule on that within an hour or so, but it just comes to my
mind that there's certainly a constitutional issue of due
process and self-incrimination -- or involuntary
incrimination when a defendant has a right to refuse to give
a blood test in a DUI case and suffer certain consequences as
a result of that because the procedures are established on
how it is to be done.

But again, that is what initially

comes to my mind about this at least addressing the
constitutional questions of a defendant's right to due
process and the incrimination against his own desires similar
to any other incrimination.
For example, I —

I read the law as being different in a

DUI case than someone who is convicted of a crime who has to
give a test for DNA samples because there are statutory
provisions governing the one and the other as well.

I think

there are statutory provisions on voluntary testing in DUI
cases, and the exception would have to be persuasive, you
know, for any court I think to allow it in. And your
argument is that you think that it's still admissible even
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though it was involuntarily drawn.
MS. BEATON:

I do think so. And I think that the

state should be at least given the opportunity to explore
this in terms of the legal research thatfs involved, in terms
of the factual development of the evidence that needs to be
developed with the witnesses that the state chooses.
And I think really the issue that we're dealing with — I
understand what defense counsel is saying, they think this is
simply an admissibility issue.

But what it's -- what it is

asking the Court to do is to suppress evidence that the state
until today had assumed was coming in.
THE COURT:

And I don't think the state can assume

that.
MS. BEATON:

Right.

So if the Court wants to

apportion blame, that's fine.
THE COURT:
understand.

No.

It's not apportionment of blame.

I

Ms. Beaton, you're one of the finest prosecutors

that I've ever seen, you really are.
MS. BEATON:
THE COURT:

(Unintelligible).
You just are a very diligent prosecutor.

And I want you to know that there's no blame here, it's just
something that unfortunately you weren't prepared to deal
with today and I -- you're one of the most thorough
prosecutors.

And I understand the problem here, you assumed

something that perhaps shouldn't have been assumed.
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anybody that's been a prosecutor or a defense attorney runs
into these kinds of things and so it's certainly not a fault
issue.
It's a matter of I've got a jury here ready to try the
case, we've got a defendant here ready to be tried, he's got
a right to have a speedy, public trial and this date was the
date set for a trial and both sides have to come prepared.
And this is an issue that based on —

I can see where your

assumption came from, it turned out to not be a correct
assumption because of Mr. McKay's not raising it before —
MS, BEATON:
THE COURT:

Well, I mean he said -—

and you assumed that he had the

burden to raise it and I'm saying, no, he can object to it at
trial.

That's really where that problem arises.
MS. BEATON:

But I think even when we were back in

chambers talking about this we were having a difficult time
trying to determine from Mr. McKay whether or not he was even
objecting to the admissibility when he had to -THE COURT:
know.

He could be silent about it even, you

He doesn't have that burden.

That's one of the things

about the defense's position is they have many more options
than I think the prosecution does, I really -- you know, and
that sometimes may lead to some unfairness.
MS. BEATON:

But there are limits as to what he can

do.
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THE COURT:
MS. BEATON:

But he's not -And he's asking to you suppress

evidence in front of a jury —
THE COURT:
MS. BEATON:

Well --- and that motion to suppress has not

been filed.
THE COURT:

Well, when I learned about it he wasn't

saying he was going to move to suppress it, he was just going
to object to it.
matter.

It's the same thing as all practical

He's just going to object to its admissibility at

the trial.

He loves all the facts surrounding it coming in

so he wanted all of those things as part of his strategy.
And Mr. McKay, you're stepping on my wire down there.
MR. MCKAY:

Is that what's happening?

I'm sorry.

heard that noise and I didn't -- I apologize, your Honor.

I
I

was just trying to stretch my leg.
THE COURT:

Well, it's not your fault because a lot

of attorneys do it.
MR. MCKAY:

I'm sorry.

THE COURT:

But in any event, Ms. Beaton, before you

make your motion to dismiss I think I need to discuss with
you if your motion to dismiss is going to be made, I will
take that under advisement, but I'm telling you I'll probably
rule against you on it. And there are other charges here
that have
nothing to do with this test. There's an evading
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charge, a third degree felony, that has nothing to do with
the DUI; there is no insurance charge, which has nothing to
do with the DUI; and there is a driving on a revoked license,
a Class B, which has nothing to do with the DUI. And I doubt
that you want to dismiss those knowing that they would be
dismissed with prejudice, because we could go ahead with
those issues before the jury.
MS. BEATON:

Well, your Honor, with -- the state's

position is, is that the state has the ability as part of
executive branch to brings charges and to dismiss charges.
If this was a situation where it appeared to the Court that
the state was doing this just to violate the defendant's
speedy trial rights, then perhaps that would be a basis for
the Court to dismiss.
THE COURT:
MS. BEATON:

No, that's not -- that's not the issue.
So the state's position is, is that the

state has not asked for a continuance of this trial.

The

state is prepared to go but the state now has an issue that
it does not feel like it's prepared to present at this point.
There is an alternative trial date that has already been
set because there was going to be a scheduling problem
already.

This is the first time this case has actually been

set for trial and this defendant is not in custody, so we're
not dealing with speedy trial issues involving this defendant
or the state's desire to delay.

Because as the Court has
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indicated, I have appeared very -- quite a few times in this
courtroom and I'm not doing anything to delay in any of these
cases.

Nine times out of 10 I'm the one asking if we can go

forward sooner than defense counsel wants to.

But

nevertheless the state's —
THE COURT:
MS. BEATON:

But I have a jury'here, that's the —
I know.

And I did not realize this was

going to be an issue until this morning, and that may be my
fault, that may be Mr. McKay's fault.
THE COURT:

But nonetheless

—

Well, getting past -- getting past that

issue, what do you want to do with these other three charges?
MS. BEATON:

The state is not --is going to dismiss

the entire case because it's all part of one criminal
episode.

Because if the dismissal is granted, I believe that

is an issue the state can appeal, and if that is appealed and
overturned then the state would be back and we would try all
of the case at the same time because we would be barred
otherwise -- if the case came back on appeal for the DUI and
the evading and the driving on suspension and the no
insurance had already been tried, we would then be barred
from the DUI. And as the Court can see the see, the DUI is
obviously the most serious of the charges that we're dealing
with here because the defendant is in felony range, this is
his seventh DUI.
THE COURT:

That's a choice only you can make
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because we could try that and I'm not certain that the DUI
would necessarily be barred based on the fact that it's the
Court that is telling -MS, BEATON:

It would violate double jeopardy if it

came back.
THE COURT:

-- you to go ahead to -- well, the

jury -- no, the jury has not been empaneled yet.
MS. BEATON:

But if we empanel the jury and I try

the evading, the driving on suspension and the no insurance
and we reserve the issue on the DUI and I move to dismiss the
DUI and for some reason the Court of Appeals agrees and they
return the DUI back to this Court, I would be precluded from
trying the DUI.
THE COURT:

Not necessarily.

So what do you want to

do?
MS. BEATON:
THE COURT:
MS. BEATON:
THE COURT:

State moves to dismiss.
All of the charges?
Right.

(Unintelligible.)

You understand that this case with all

four counts, if I dismiss I feel I have to dismiss them with
prejudice because the defense is ready to proceed on them and
the reasons for the continuance are not justifiable.
MS. BEATON:

By they have to amount to

unconstitutional delay -THE COURT:

That's in essence what you're doing is

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

56

you're just dismissing the charges because I am not giving
you time to address that one issue.
MS. BEATON:

The state does not feel like it's

prepared with witnesses, with legal analysis to make this
argument today.
THE COURT:
MS. BEATON:

On the admissibility of the test.
On the issue as to whether or not the

blood alcohol level should be suppressed.
THE COURT:
MS. BEATON:

Right.

Well, or —

And the state does not believe that

it is doing this -THE COURT:

Or in other words, whether the judge

should sustain the objection to if it's clearly going to be
raised like Mr. McKay says he will object.
All right.

If you move to dismiss, knowing that this is

going to be a dismissal of all of these charges with
prejudice then I will grant that motion, even though that's
not what you want, you understand that's what will happen?
MS. BEATON:

The state asks for factual findings as

to why the state's motion to continue is not being
granted and why —
THE COURT:
MS. BEATON:
THE COURT:

And I will prepare --- the state's motion to dismiss -I will prepare the factual basis for the
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All right.

Then these charges are dismissed with

prejudice.
(The matter concluded.)
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